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A CRITICAL REASSESSMENT OF THE CASE LAW
BEARING ON CONGRESS'S POWER TO RESTRICT THE
JURISDICTION OF THE LOWER FEDERAL COURTS
GORDON G. YOUNG*
INTRODUCTION
Federal constitutional rights are not subject to direct repeal by
any legislature.' Nevertheless, commentators traditionally have recog-
nized a less direct type of congressional power to seriously frustrate, if
not completely destroy, such rights through control of the jurisdiction
of the lower federal courts.2 This Article reexamines the precedents
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1. See U.S. CONST. art. VI ("This Constitution . . . shall be the supreme Law of the
Land."). This holds true for the protections directly required by the Constitution as inter-
preted by the Supreme Court. However, some Court-declared rules, derived from rights
required by the Constitution, are most likely part of a federal constitutional common law
devised by the Court to implement the more direct constitutional commands. Henry P.
Monaghan, The Supreme Court 1974 Term Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L.
REv. 1, 2-3, 15-17, 33 (1975). A possible example of such a rule is the one announced in
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (recognizing an
action for damages against federal officers who conduct an illegal search, a cause of action
stemming from, but not necessarily created by, the Fourth Amendment). Monaghan,
supra, at 19-23, 33-34. Congress may well have power to preempt such constitutional com-
mon law by devising alternative effective measures to implement the constitutional text in
question. Id. at 3, 23-30. If Congress substantively can extinguish a particular federal con-
stitutional common law right by substituting an effective alternative, it may also have more
than its usual power to do the same by means of jurisdictional exclusion coupled with an
adequate alternative enforcement mechanism. This Article will pursue federal constitu-
tional common law rights no farther. When it questions whether Congress can frustrate
constitutional rights by excluding their enforcement from the lower federal courts, it con-
siders full blown ights, arising directly from the Constitution, e.g., most First Amendment
rights, Due Process rights, and Equal Protection rights.
2. See, e.g., Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of the Federal
Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARv. L. REv. 1362 (1953); Paul M. Bator, Congressional
Power over the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 27 VILL. L. REv. 1030, 1032-35 (1982). From
one perspective, complete control of lower federal court jurisdiction allows Congress a
means to frustrate constitutional rights recognized by the federal courts. It remains, how-
ever, a tool of limited utility. This is so because it seems likely that, if the lower federal
courts as a whole are closed to a constitutional claim, then the state courts must remain
open to hear it. This would be true even if Congress has attempted to close them off as
well. See infra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
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bearing on the constitutionality of "court-stripping" laws,' those laws
by which Congress asserts its power to restrict the lower federal courts'
jurisdiction to enforce specified constitutional rights. It concludes
that the relevant Supreme Court cases offer less support for complete
congressional power than courts and commentators have assumed.
This conclusion, in turn, provides support for recent scholarship that
questions the traditional view on textual and other grounds, but
which, up to now, has relegated analysis of precedent to a relatively
minor role.
Until the 1970s, scholars read Supreme Court opinions and re-
lated commentary as granting Congress the power to court strip virtu-
ally without limit.4 The most often cited Supreme Court opinions on
the subject contain language suggesting nearly unlimited congres-
sional power to exclude cases of any sort from the jurisdiction of the
lower federal courts.5 The late Paul Bator summed up this traditional
view:
The position that the Constitution obligates Congress to
create lower federal courts, or (having created them) to vest
3. This Article will refer to federal statutes which attempt to remove lower federal
court jurisdiction over a disfavored class of constitutional claims by their popular name,
"court-stripping" legislation. See, e.g., Max Baucus & Kenneth R. Kay, The Court Stripping
Bills: Their Impact on the Constitution, the Courts, and Congress, 27 ViLE. L. REv. 988, 989-90
(1981-82); Raoul Berger, Insulation of Judicial Usurpation: A Comment on Lawrence Sager's
"Court-Stripping" Polemic, 44 Omio ST. L.J. 611 (1983); Maurice Rosenberg, ChiefJudge Wil-
fted Feinberg: A Twenty-Fifth Year Tribute, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 1505, 1513 (1986); Lawrence G.
Sager, Constitutional Limitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal
Courts, 95 HARv. L. REv. 17, 17 (1981).
4. See infta Part I. From this perspective, Congress's power extends so far as to permit
the exclusion of many constitutional claims from federal court enforcement. See infra
notes 51-74 and accompanying text. Before the early 1970s, the only contrary suggestions
appeared in a few lower federal court cases. See, e.g., Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169
F.2d 254, 257 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 887 (1948). More recent scholarly discussion,
however, has challenged the breadth of Congress's powers to court strip. See infra Part II.B.
Even the traditional scholars who take the most generous view of Congress's power to
control the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts generally recognize some limits. For
example, almost all commentators would presumably agree that claims of African Ameri-
can plaintiffs could not be excluded from the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts solely
on grounds of their race. See Bator, supra note 2, at 1034; Barry Friedman, A Different
Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Congress and Federal Jurisdiction, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 1, 6 n.2 7
(1990) (finding nearly universal agreement as to the invalidity of jurisdictional exclusion
of cases brought by members of traditionally suspect classes); see also Gerald Gunther, Con-
gressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate,
36 STAN. L. REv. 895, 916-22 (1984) (embracing the broad view of Congress's jurisdictional
powers as extending to constitutional rights cases, but recognizing some limits to this
power based on the Fifth Amendment's equal protection component).
5. See cases discussed infra notes 38-79 and accompanying text. A particularly strong
statement appears in Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 187 (1943); see infra text accompa-
nying note 72.
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them with some or all of the jurisdiction authorized by
[A] rticle III, has been repudiated by an unbroken line of au-
thoritative judicial and legislative precedents.
In light of this clear-and consistent-line of au-
thority in the Supreme Court, occasional lower-court dicta
which espouse the opposite view do not have authoritative
weight.6
Not all of the Court's statements, affirming broad congressional
powers, have been viewed simply as dicta. Scholarly commentary ap-
pears to recognize one Supreme Court case, Lauf v. E.G. Shinner &
Co.,7 as holding that Congress's jurisdictional powers permit selective
exclusion of constitutional rights from lower federal court jurisdic-
tions.' Commentators suggest that, in Lauf the Court upheld the ap-
plication of a jurisdictional limitation that excluded an appellant's
constitutional claims from the federal trial court below.9 The com-
mentators' traditional view is that there is no Supreme Court case with
a contrary holding. In other words, the traditional view is that the
Court has never struck down a court-stripping law. t" Below I contest
this depiction of a uniform body of case law with the counter example,
Armstrong v. United States,"' a case in which the Supreme Court did
negate such a law.12
Starting in 1974, the Supreme Court seemed to reverse field.
Statements in several cases since that time have questioned the validity
of court stripping.'" Apparently ignoring the traditional view of the
6. Bator, supra note 2, at 1031-33.
7. 303 U.S. 323 (1938).
8. See infra notes 9, 39, 53-74 and accompanying text.
9. This reading of Lauf is suggested in a combined reading of Hart's dialectical arti-
cle, Hart, supra note 2, at 1363, and a passage that appears in all three editions of his
superb casebook. See HENRY M. HART & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 295 (lsT ED. 1953) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER 1ST]; PAUL M. BATOR ET
AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 316-17 (2d ed.
1973) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER 2D]; PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 370 (3d ed. 1988) [hereinafter HART & WECHS-
LER 3D]. For the text of these passages, see infra note 195. See infra Part W.B., for my
argument to the contrary. There I assert that Lauf may well contain no holding permitting
cases to be excluded from the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts for the purpose of
denying enforcement to specified constitutional rights.
10. See infra notes 58-79 and accompanying text.
11. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 154 (1872).
12. See infra notes 22-24 and Parts III, IV (disputing the traditional view of the cases).
13. SeeJohnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 366-67 (1974); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S.
749, 762 (1975) (acknowledging that if the Social Security Act was construed to preclude
constitutional challenges it would raise a "serious constitutional question"); Bowen v. Mich-
igan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 681 n.12 (1986) (construing neither 42
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case law record described above, majority opinions began to suggest
that at least some court-stripping laws would indeed raise grave consti-
tutional questions.1 4 In so doing, the Court offered no reappraisal of
the cases that were traditionally read as supporting unlimited congres-
sional power.
Nearly simultaneously with the Court's apparent reappraisal of
Congress's power to court strip, substantial scholarship also began to
question that power.1 5 Like the Court's post-19 7 4 opinions on the
subject, this new scholarship has focused almost no attention on the
U.S.C. § 1395ff nor § 1395ii to bar judicial review of Medicare program regulations, ac-
knowledging that to find otherwise would raise a serious constitutional question and citing
to commentators on the court-stripping debate); Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988)
(holding that while § 102(c) of the National Security Act gives the CIA director very broad
discretion to terminate employees, it does not "exclude review of constitutional claims,"
and acknowledging that if construed otherwise, it would raise serious constitutional
questions).
14. See infra note 100.
15. Nineteen seventy-four is an unusually clear watershed for scholarly and Supreme
Court reconsideration of congressional powers over the lower federal courts' jurisdiction.
In that year, in Johnson 415 U.S. at 361, the Supreme Court first questioned the traditional
view of unlimited Congressional power to court strip. In that year as well, serious scholarly
reconsideration of those powers began with Theodore Eisenberg's theoretical argument
against court stripping. Theodore Eisenberg, Congressional Authority to Restrict Lower Federal
Court Jurisdiction, 83 YAIE L.J. 488, 504-33 (1974).
In chronological order some of the major pieces of revisionist scholarship are: Eisen-
berg, supra; Martin H. Redish & Curtis E. Woods, Congressional Power to Control the Jurisdic-
tion of Lower Federal Courts: A Critical Review and a New Synthesis, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 45, 102-
08 (1975); Ronald D. Rotunda, Congressional Power to Restrict the Jurisdiction of the Lower Fed-
eral Courts and the Problem of School Busing, 64 GEO. L.J. 839, 866-67 (1976); Sager, supra note
3; Laurence H. Tribe, Jurisdictional Genymandering- Zoning Disfavored Rights Out of the Federal
Courts, 16 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 129, 139-46 (1981); Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View
of Federal Court Jurisdiction: A Guided Quest for the Original Understanding of Article III, 132 U.
PA. L. Rev. 741, 748-54, 840-55 (1984) (taking no position on the existence of limits on
Congress's powers but offering arguments which support such limits); Akhil R. Amar, A
Neo-Federalist View of Article III. Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REv.
205 (1985).
Before 1974, just one revisionist article appeared. See Frank Thompson, Jr. & Daniel
H. Pollitt, Congressional Control ofJudicial Remedies: President Nixon's Proposed Moratorium on
"Busing" Orders, 50 N.C. L. Rev. 809, 836-41 (1972) (arguing that Congress cannot restrict
the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts when doing so would deny to individuals rights
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment). This paucity of scholarship existed despite some
proposed and some enacted federal legislation at the time that sought to bar the federal
courts from enforcing certain constitutional rights. See infra notes 25-27 and accompany-
ing text.
As for pre-1974 Supreme Court cases suggesting limits, Justice Story's opinion for the
Court in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. 141,149-67, 1 Wheat. 304, 323-62 (1816), is the
only one recognized in either the traditional or new scholarship. That opinion questioned
complete congressional control in dictum. See id. at 327-34. Story's dictum has largely
been dismissed by the scholarship, including the new scholarship arguing for limits on
Congress's court-stripping powers. But seeAmar, supra, at 205, 210-19, 272 n.222 (recogniz-
ing Story's valuable, if flawed, contribution to what Amar sees as a correct reading).
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case law which seemed to support the traditional view, and instead
focused on the text of the Constitution and its history. 6 In other
words, this new scholarship took an adverse case law record as a well-
established obstacle, not to be challenged head on, but rather to be
overcome by other relevant arguments. 17
For more than a decade, the Court's apparently revisionist state-
ments provoked neither significant comment in the law journals nor
dissent on the Court. Then, in 1988, dissenting in Webster v. Doe,18
Justice Scalia leveled an attack on the Court's revisionist statements by
stressing the Constitution's text and the case law which he read as
legitimating nearly complete congressional power to withdraw any cat-
egories of cases from lower federal court jurisdiction. 9 Is Justice
Scalia correct? I believe that he is not.
For my argument that there are anti-court-stripping cases neglected by the modem
Court and commentators, including a Supreme Court case holding a court-stripping mea-
sure unconstitutional, see infra notes 22-24 and accompanying text, and infra Part III.
16. Surprisingly, the Supreme Court's new apparent openness to limits on Congress's
jurisdictional powers seems to have had little influence on the new scholarship. Among
those articles listed in note 15, supra, only Lawrence Sager's mentions Johnson v. Robison.
See Sager, supra note 3, at 76 n.183. This is particularly surprising in the case of Tribe,
whose thesis for limiting exclusion of constitutional claims from the lower federal courts is
bolstered by the Court's opinion in Johnson. See infra notes 125-128 and accompanying
text. The lack of reference to Johnson by Amar and Clinton is less surprising because their
theses involve the assertion that certain claims must be cognizable either in the federal trial
courts or in the Supreme Court on appeal from the state courts. See infra notes 128-131
and accompanying text.
17. Typically Lauf v. E.G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323 (1938), the only arguable hold-
ing favoring court stripping, see infra notes 51-58 and accompanying text, when mentioned
at all in the new scholarship, is dealt with in footnotes without any examination of its
language and facts. See, e.g., Lea Brillmayer & Stefan Underhill, Congressional Obligation to
Provide a Forum for Constitutional Claims: Discriminatoiy Jurisdictional Rules and the Conflict of
Laws, 69 VA. L. REv. 819, 841 n.109 (1983); Clinton, supra note 15, at 745 n.9; Rotunda,
supra note 15, at 851-52; Sager, supra note 3, at 33 n.43; Tribe, supra note 15, at 145 n.67.
For brief but rewarding discussions of Lauf which offer more scrutiny and analysis, see
Eisenberg, supra note 15, at 528-30; Mark Tushnet &JenniferJaff, Why the Debate Over Con-
gress'Powers to Restrict the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts is Unending, 72 GEo. L.J. 1311, 1322-
23 n.52 (1984).
18. 486 U.S. 592, 606-21 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
19. Id. at 611-15 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing the text of Article III and quoting
from Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. 453, 461, 8 How. 441, 449 (1850)). Justice O'Connor also
dissented in Webster, but was unwilling to determine the general validity of court stripping.
She found Congress's jurisdictional powers particularly potent in cases involving CIA per-
sonnel decisions and, thus, adequate to support the statutory exclusion that was before the
Court in Webster. Id. at 605-06 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). She stressed that CIA employ.
ment affected presidential powers involving foreign relations: "Whatever may be the exact
scope of Congress's power to close the lower federal courts to constitutional claims in
other contexts, I have no doubt about its authority to do so here." Id. at 605 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
[VOL. 54:132
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Justice Scalia is wrong, because the Supreme Court precedent
supporting the traditional view-that articulated by Henry Hart and
Paul Bator and recently pressed by Scalia himself-is much weaker
than it seems. Admittedly, the case law record does contain powerful
dicta supporting nearly unlimited congressional power. But the tradi-
tionally cited cases do not support broad congressional powers to the
degree that such scholarship suggests.20 Indeed, a case can be made
that the only Supreme Court holding that speaks to Congress's court-
stripping powers is one that supports the existence of limits on con-
gressional power. In Armstrong v. United States,2" a post-Civil War case
discussed at length below,22 the Court struck down a court-stripping
measure. But this case seems to have been unknown to twentieth cen-
tury judges and scholars until discussed in an article I wrote a decade
ago.23 The case has received only slight consideration since then.24
The issue of congressional control of lower federal court jurisdic-
tion is an important one:25 According to one commentator, since the
1940s Congress has introduced well over 100 proposals limiting consti-
tutional rights by depriving the lower federal courts of the jurisdiction
necessary to hear cases brought to enforce them.2 6 Most such propos-
als made during the last twenty-five years attempt to limit enforcement
of the Supreme Court-declared rights to abortion, to prayer-free pub-
lic schools, or to busing to achieve school desegregation.
Although none of the recent court-stripping proposals has be-
come law,28 the recognition of such congressional power is not new.
Beginning in the mid-1950s, court stripping has been the subject of
20. See infra Part IV.
21. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 154 (1872).
22. See infra Part III.
23. Gordon G. Young, Congressional Regulation of Federal Courts'Jurisdiction and Processes:
United States v. Klein Revisited, 1981 Wis. L. REv. 1189, 1214 n.135, 1215 n.139. I am
indebted to Larry Sager for bringing to light Waring v. United States, 7 Ct. Cl. 501, 504
(1872), which led me to Armstrong. See Sager, supra note 3, at 29 n.31, and Young, supra, at
1222-23.
24. Hart apparently had not recognized the significance of Armstrong when he wrote
his dialectical article surveying the cases relating to Congress's jurisdictional power to ex-
clude constitutional claims. See supra note 2. With two exceptions-my article and the
Hart and Wechsler casebook-Armstrong has not since been acknowledged in the debate
over Congress's court-stripping powers. Hart & Wechsler simply observes that my earlier
article "notes that the jurisdictional implications of [Armstrong] may be broader than the
significance of Klein," a case not dealing with court stripping. HART & WECHSLER 3D, supra
note 9, at 370 n.5. See infra Part III for a detailed discussion of Armstrong.
25. But see Tushnet &Jaff, supra note 17, at 1327 (arguing that the political process is
probably an adequate mechanism to achieve desired results).
26. HART & WECHSLER 3D, supra note 9, at 377; Sager, supra note 3, at 18 n.3.
27. HART & WECHSLER 3D, supra note 9, at 378-79.
28. Id. at 377.
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intense scholarly attention. Substantial scholarship began with Henry
Hart's The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts:
An Exercise in Dialectic,29 a widely influential article justly described as
the classic work on Congress's powers over the jurisdiction of the fed-
eral courts . 0 Hart gave great weight to the case law in ultimately con-
cluding that Congress most probably can weaken substantive
constitutional rights by denying them enforcement in the lower fed-
eral courts.31 In contrast, recent revisionist scholarship de-emphasizes
the precedents, focusing instead on other varieties of constitutional
argument.32
Some readers, including judges and Justices, may find the new
scholarship persuasive even though it conflicts with what is perceived
to be the clear weight of precedent. Other readers, however, may re-
quire a more solid grounding in precedent, no matter how persuasive
the textual, historical or structural arguments. Despite the uncertain
strength of stare decisis in constitutional law,33 these readers may find
the apparently clear case law an impediment to acceptance of the new
arguments which would limit congressional power to restrict lower
federal court jurisdiction.34
29. Hart, supra note 2.
30. Sager, supra note 3, at 20 n.7; see also Amar, supra note 15, at 215.
31. Hart, supra note 2, at 1388-91, 1397-98 (so concluding, but recognizing a possible
exception for habeas corpus jurisdiction which might be viewed as required by the consti-
tutional text); see also Bator, supra note 2, at 1031-33.
32. See supra note 17 and accompanying text; see also infra Part II.B.
33. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpreta-
tion, 100 HARv. L. REv. 1189, 1245 (1987) ("the principle is clear that stare decisis is enti-
tled to less weight in constitutional than in nonconstitutional cases"); Earl M. Maltz, Some
Thoughts on the Death of Stare Decisis in Constitutional Law, 1980 Wis. L. REv. 467 (finding
merit in arguments for a reduced role for stare decisis, but finding them overstated);
Henry P. Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 723,
738-48 (1988) (debating the appropriate role of stare decisis in constitutional
adjudication).
34. Most readers, I assume, give less than dispositive weight to precedents in constitu-
tional argument and, rather, take a position toward constitutional interpretation resem-
bling what Richard Fallon has called "constructivist." Fallon, supra note 33. Constructivism
advocates reading a constitutional provision, if possible, in the way that achieves a satisfying
convergence of textual, structural, precedential, legislative, historical and prudential fac-
tors. Id. at 1194-1209, 1237-43. If this is not possible, Fallon urges weighing these factors
in a hierarchical order, starting with what he perceives as the most weighty and descending
to the least. These are arguments (1) from text, (2) of historical intent, (3) of theory, (4)
from precedent, and (5) of value. Id. at 1243-46. Of these, all but theory and value are
reasonably self-explanatory.
Fallon's notion of "theory" is derived from a broader look at text and intent in order
to answer questions not specifically addressed by either. Where specific text answers a
specific question (e.g., the minimum age for a President of the United States) the text is
dispositive. Id. at 1244. If a specific section of text and intent behind it is not clear, it is
necessary to look at larger sections of text (perhaps the whole Constitution) and the intent
138 [VOL. 54:132
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My claim is that the cases discussed below cannot be taken as a
clear and unbroken case law record that supports Congress's powers
to court strip. Carefully examined, the cases render inconclusive what
had seemed a clear case law record favoring nearly complete congres-
sional power. As a consequence, the matter can be viewed as much
more open even to those who might conclude that clear precedent
would be dispositive as to the validity of Congress's court-stripping
powers. Hence, suggestions of limits on Congress's jurisdictional pow-
ers appearing in Court opinions and commentary since the middle of
the 1970s are not as outrageous as Justice Scalia's recent dissent in
Webster or Hart's "dialogue" suggest, and they certainly merit careful
consideration.
Part I below briefly surveys the well-known cases and scholarship
supporting broad congressional powers to court strip. Part II briefly
surveys post-1974 materials that appear to reverse course, suggesting
limits on Congress's powers to exclude constitutional cases. These
materials include both Supreme Court cases summarily suggesting
that there may be limits on Congress and a robust new scholarship
which argues for limits. Part III presents a little known Reconstruc-
tion era Supreme Court case, Armstrong v. United States,2,and closely
connected cases in the Court of Claims. Part IV closely reexamines
the traditionally cited case law, particularly Lauf v. E.G. Shinner &
Co. 6 It concludes that, contrary to suggestions in the commentary,
Lauf may well contain no holding that Congress's jurisdictional pow-
ers go so far as to permit exclusion of constitutional claims.
behind them to fashion a general approach to questions not specifically answered. Id. at
1244-45. Fallon presents John Hart Ely's representation enforcing theory as one example
of just such a generalized approach to interpreting constitutional text. Id. at 1200, 1217-
23.
"Value," for Fallon, means a judge's view of what is a morally acceptable result, but
arguments from value are given effect only after exhausting the hierarchically higher argu-
ments in a search for a determinative answer. Id, at 1262-68.
A constructivist hopes never to use the hierarchy in a crudely mechanical way, but
rather hopes to find answers to constitutional questions that can be harmonized in a satis-
fying way under all of these arguments. I. at 1240-48. Even a constructivist might find the
other factors so closely balanced as to the validity of court stripping that a clear and unbro-
ken line of cases, including a Supreme Court holding, would be dispositive. My argument
is that, as to court stripping, such a line of cases is not available to "break the tie." Thus, a
constructivist would need to engage either in a reassessment of the other factors or in an
attempt to attribute weight and direction to the conflicting case law, or in both, to reach
the most satisfying balance.
35. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 154 (1872).
36. 303 U.S. 322 (1938).
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I. WELL-KNOWN CASES AND SCHOLARSHIP: HART'S DIALOGUE AND ITS
DISCUSSION OF THE CASE LAw
In his dialogue, 7 Hart identifies seven cases as bearing strongly
on the legitimacy of court stripping: Sheldon v. Sill,3" Lauf v. E.G. Shin-
net & Co.,39 Lockerty v. Phillips,4" Wong Wing v. United States,4' Ng Fung
Ho v. White,42 Lipke v. Lederer,"3 and Battaglia v. General Motors Corp.44
The first three are Supreme Court cases that Hart argues strongly sup-
port congressional power to disallow jurisdiction virtually at will, with-
out regard to the importance of the rights frustrated. 45 The latter
four cases offer some support for limits on Congress's power to ex-
clude constitutional cases.46 I will discuss each of these cases and
Hart's treatment of them, in turn.
A. Cases Arguably Strongly Supporting Court-Stripping Powers
In Sheldon, the lower federal court approved a statute which, in
certain circumstances, removed lower federal court jurisdiction to
hear suits between two parties of diverse state citizenship.4 7 The stat-
ute created an exception to diversity jurisdiction for suits seeking to
enforce contractual obligations originally existing between a debtor
and creditor domiciled in the same state but later assigned to a plain-
tiff with diverse citizenship.4" In the Supreme Court, Sill, the plaintiff
below, challenged the statutory exclusion on constitutional grounds.
There was no doubt as to the correctness of the first part of Sill's argu-
ment: Suits such as his "between citizens of different states" are ex-
pressly included in the federal judicial power as defined in Article III.
The correctness of the second part of his argument was more in
doubt. Drawing on the language of Article III that "the judicial power
of the United States shall be vested" in the federal courts, Sill argued
that Congress must vest all of the judicial power in the federal courts.
Consequently, Sill argued, Congress could not excise cases such as his
37. Hart, supra note 2.
38. 49 U.S. 453, 8 How. 441 (1850).
39. 303 U.S. 323 (1938).
40. 319 U.S. 182 (1943).
41. 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
42. 259 U.S. 276 (1922).
43. 259 U.S. 557 (1922).
44. 169 F.2d 254 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 887 (1948).
45. Hart, supra note 2, at 1362-64.
46. Id. at 1383 & n.67, 1387-88.
47. Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. 453, 460, 8 How. 441, 448 (1850). The federal judicial
power, as defined in the Constitution, includes suits between citizens of different states.
U.S. CoNsr. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
48. Sheldon, 49 U.S. at 460, 8 How. at 448.
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from the federal trial courts' jurisdiction.49 Despite this argument,
the Court upheld the statute denying the lower federal courts jurisdic-
tion, thus concluding that Congress possessed the power to withhold
at least some portions of the judicial power from the federal courts.5
Because Sheldon involved a state law contract claim, arguably its
holding goes no further than to allow Congress to make technical ad-
justments to jurisdiction where no important federal right is at stake.
Nevertheless, the announced rationale is much broader. Noting that
the Constitution gives Congress power over the very existence of lower
federal courts, the Sheldon Court seemed to conclude that the congres-
sional power to create the courts implied a lesser included power over
the jurisdiction of those courts that Congress chooses to create. 5 The
Court wrote, "Courts created by statute can have no jurisdiction but
such as the statute confers."5 2 If this is correct, a statute disallowing
lower federal court jurisdiction over a category of cases is per se con-
stitutional: The courts must uphold it.
Unlike the statute upheld in Sheldon, the statute at issue in Laufv.
Shinner cannot so easily be characterized as permitting only technical
adjustments to the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts. The stat-
ute attacked in Laufseemed designed to remove federal courtjurisdic-
tion to issue injunctions necessary to protect employers' due process
rights to liberty of contract as those rights were understood at the
time.5 3 Roughly thirty years before Lauf the Court had struck down,
as violative of substantive due process, a federal regulation interfering
with employers' rights to bargain for "yellow-dog contracts," i.e., con-
tracts in which employees promises to abjure union membership.5 4 In
Truax v. Corrigan,55 decided seventeen years before Lauf the Supreme
Court appeared to hold that employers' due process right to make
49. Id. at 459-61, 8 How. at 446-48. Because this type of suit is not an appeal and
because the Constitution excludes it from the Supreme Court's trial jurisdiction, U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2, lower federal trial courts are the only sort of federal courts appro-
priate for the trial of such a diversity suit.
50. Sheldon, 49 U.S. at 461-63, 8 How. at 448-50.
51. Id. at 461, 8 How. at 449. For a discussion of Sheldon's status as dicta with respect to
court stripping, see infra note 181 and accompanying text.
52. Id.
53. See S. REP. No. 163, 72d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 10, pt. 2, at 6-8 (1932); H.R. REP.
No. 669, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 669 (1932); HART & WECHSLER 3D, supra note 9, at 370.
54. See Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (protecting, under substantive due
process analysis, employers' right to bargain for employees' promise of non-union activity);
see also Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (finding an analogous Fourteenth Amend-
ment due process limitation on the states).
55. 257 U.S. 312 (1921).
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such bargains carried with it a subsidiary due process right to have
employees' promises enforced by means of injunctive relief. 6
Those earlier opinions, while seriously in question at the time of
Lauf had not yet been overruled."' Hart and Wechsler's original
casebook seems to suggest that the Lauf Court turned away a plaintiff
asserting the constitutional right to an injunction declared in Truax
on the ground that the court-stripping provision trumped it.58 On
this view, Lauf adds holding to Sheldon's dicta59 that Congress can
eliminate any sorts of cases-including those pressing constitutional
rights-from the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts. Hart's dia-
logue cites Lauf in conjunction with Sheldon as the clinching case:
Q. Does the Constitution give people any right to proceed or
be proceeded against, in the first instance, in a federal rather
than a state court?
A. It's hard to see how the answer can be anything but no, in
view of cases like Sheldon v. Sill and Lauf v. E.G. Shinner & Co.
and in view of the language and history of the Constitution
itself.60
Dicta in the Court's later opinion, Lockerty v. Phillips,61 provide us
with clear reasoning that strengthens Hart's conclusion as to Con-
gress's powers. In Lockerty, the plaintiffs sought preliminary and per-
manent injunctive relief against a federal price control scheme
alleged to violate their constitutional rights.6 2 According to the stat-
ute permanent injunctive relief was available only in a special Article
III court, the Emergency Court of Appeals, and all courts, state and
56. Id. at 340-41. In a later portion of this Article, I argue that Truax is more plausibly
seen as having been based on equal protection analysis. See infra notes 251-254 and accom-
panying text.
57. Approximately at the time Lauf was decided, the Court ended its practice of strictly
scrutinizing the regulation of economic activity under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments and under the Equal Protection Clause of the letter. See
infra note 240 for a discussion of substantive due process.
58. HART & WECHSLER lsr, supra note 9, at 295. For a brief discussion of the right
recognized in Truax and the Norris-LaGuardia Act of March 23, 1932, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115
(1988), which denied enforcement of the right in the federal courts, see HART & WECHSLER
3D, supra note 9, at 370. See infra Part IV.B. for a longer analysis of Truax and its relation-
ship to Lauf
59. Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. 453, 461, 8 How. 441, 448-49 (1850).
60. Hart, supra note 2, at 1363 (footnotes omitted). For my argument that Lauf may
not be a formidable precedent, see infra Part IV.A. & B.
61. 319 U.S. 182, 187 (1943).
62. Id. at 184-85. For an indication that temporary relief was sought in the Federal
District Court, see Lockerty v. Phillips, 49 F. Supp. 513, 516 (D. N.J. 1943) (Fake, J.,
dissenting).
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federal, were forbidden to grant interlocutory remedies.6" The
Supreme Court held that the federal district court could grant none
of the relief that the plaintiffs requested.64 It based its decision on the
provision of the price control scheme that purported to deny that
court and all others jurisdiction to grant interlocutory relief.65 The
Supreme Court expressly avoided deciding the plaintiffs' claim that
the provision denied them such relief in any Article III court. 66 Thus
it reached no decision as to the validity of court stripping.
Nevertheless Lockerty's dicta take a generous view of congressional
powers over jurisdiction and explain their existence by expanding on
the arguments sketched out in Sheldon.67 The Court starts with the
premise that Congress was not obliged to create any lower federal
courts at all. 8 This premise finds nearly certain support both in the
Constitution's text69 and in the history of compromises made at the
Constitutional Convention.7 ° Lockerty, like Sheldon, then draws the
forceful, but less than certain, conclusion that Congress's greater
power to confer no jurisdiction at all includes a lesser power to create
lower federal courts but to confer on them as much or as little of the
63. Id. at 186-89; see also HART & WECHSLER 3D, supra note 9, at 371-72.
64. 319 U.S. at 189.
65. Id. at 184-89.
66. Id. at 189. The Court explicitly refused to rule on the constitutionality of the provi-
sion excluding the power to grant interim relief from the Emergency Court of Appeals's
jurisdiction. The Court noted that the statute contained a separability provision and con-
cluded that the exclusion of such relief from the jurisdiction of the federal district courts
was constitutional.
My conjecture is that the Lockerty Court believed that, if interim injunctive relief were a
constitutional necessity, the Emergency Court of Appeals was the court that should provide
it. All state and federal courts, including the Emergency Court of Appeals, were statutorily
forbidden to provide interim relief. However, the Emergency Court of Appeals alone was
authorized to grant permanent injunctive relief. Presumably, then, if Congress could not
make its blanket prohibition on interim fully effective, it would have preferred that relief
be provided in the expert tribunal that possessed exclusive jurisdiction over analogous
matters.
67. Id. at 187; see Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. 453, 460-63, 8 How. 441, 448-50 (1850).
68. Lockerty, 319 U.S. at 187.
69. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
70. See HART & WECHSLER 3D, supra note 9, at 10-11. There were those at the Conven-
tion who favored requiring the creation of lower federal courts. Id. Their opponents fa-
vored forbidding the creation of such courts, thereby forcing Congress to rely on state
courts as the exclusive trial courts for enforcement of federal rights. Id. The final text of
Article III allowing, but not requiring, Congress to create such lower federal courts, was
not an accident. It was a deliberate compromise of the opposing views offered by James
Madison and accepted by the Convention. Id. See also Redish & Woods, supra note 15, at
52-54 (describing the events leading up to the "Madisonian Compromise").
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judicial power as Congress chooses. 71 Lockerty's language is clear and
forceful:
There is nothing in the Constitution which requires Con-
gress to confer equity jurisdiction on any particular inferior
federal court. All federal courts, other than the Supreme
Court, derive their jurisdiction wholly from the exercise of
the authority to "ordain and establish" inferior courts, con-
ferred on Congress by Article III, § 1, of the Constitution.
Article III left Congress free to establish inferior federal
courts or not as it thought appropriate. It could have de-
clined to create any such courts, leaving suitors to the reme-
dies afforded by state courts, with such appellate review by
this Court as Congress might prescribe. The Congressional
power to ordain and establish inferior courts includes the power "of
investing them with jurisdiction either limited, concurrent, or exclu-
sive, and of withholding jurisdiction from them in the exact degrees
and character which to Congress may seem proper for the public
good. "72
Thus as presented by Hart, Lauf and Lockerty are powerful in com-
bination. In Lauf the Court seemed to have acted on a belief in a
71. Lockerty, 319 U.S. at 187-88. The conclusion is less than certain because of the
doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions," which provides that, under some circumstances,
a government may not grant a benefit on the condition that the beneficiary surrender a
constitutional right. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HRv. L. REv.
1413, 1415 (1989); Gordon G. Young, Public Rights and the FederalJudicial Power: From Mur-
ray's Lessee Through Crowell to Schor, 35 Bury. L. REv. 765, 866 n.500 (1986). Thus, the
Constitution sometimes forbids a government, possessing a greater power, the exercise of a
lesser and, therefore, only apparently included power. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538-41 (1985) (recognizing that, while a government can create
certain property interests at its pleasure, it cannot create them on the condition that they
can be retracted without observing the normal requirements of procedural due process).
Whether a greater power includes a lesser one depends upon whether that lesser
power, exercised without the remainder, impermissibly frustrates a constitutional provi-
sion. See Sullivan, supra; Young, supra.
Sullivan provides a good example of a clearly unconstitutional condition. She
imagines that Congress, which has no obligation to provide food stamps to the needy,
offers food stamps but attaches to them the condition that they not be used to purchase
kosher food. Sullivan, supra, at 1501. Likewise, it is possible that Congress, which origi-
nally had no obligation to create lower federal courts, might have only limited control over
them once they have been established. But one would need to advance a reason for any
limit, clearly easier in the food stamp hypothetical, because of a nearly consensus view of
relevant religious freedom guarantees, than it is with respect to limits on Congress's powers
over lower federal court jurisdiction.
The validity of the "greater includes the lesser" argument as support for nearly abso-
lute congressional power to limit lower federal courtjurisdiction depends upon the degree
to which Article III interests and textual provisions for individual rights are seen as
threatened or furthered by such complete control.
72. Lockerty, 319 U.S. at 187 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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congressional power over federal trial court jurisdiction so sweeping
as to take precedence over substantive constitutional rights.7 Lockerty
spells out the forceful reasoning underlying not only itself but the ear-
lier cases of Sheldon and Lauf Congressional power over the very exist-
ence of courts strongly implies complete power over their
jurisdiction. 4
Complete congressional control of lower federal court jurisdic-
tion seems regrettable to Hart, but not catastrophic. He makes a com-
pelling, if not decisive argument that the rights targeted by court
stripping are not trumped completely out of existence by Congress's
jurisdictional powers: Rights barred from the federal courts can be
taken to the state courts, which, under the Supremacy Clause,7 5 must
honor them.76 Indeed, if a federal statute purports to deny state
courts jurisdiction to hear constitutional claims, the statute is uncon-
stitutional as long as no proper federal trial court has been opened to
the constitutional claims.7 7 As a result, when state enforcement of
federal constitutional rights is most needed, it is available.
73. But see discussion infra Parts IV.A. & B.
74. Lockerty, 319 U.S. at 187.
75. U.S. CONsr. art. VI, cl. 2.
76. Hart, supra note 2, at 1401-02. Although it is never spelled out, Hart's implicit
argument must resemble the following: The Lockerty rationale, that the power to choose
whether to create lower federal courts implies the lesser power to dictate their jurisdiction,
is not available to permit Congress to shut off the state courts from federal claims. This is
true because Congress presumably has no power to create or destroy state courts. Congres-
sional exclusion of federal claims from state courts, then, must be based upon the legiti-
mate application of one of its other affirmative powers.
Most exclusion of federal rights from state enforcement occurs when Congress seeks
to create an exclusive federal jurisdiction to enforce specified federal laws. See, e.g., Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934, § 78aa, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1988) (federal courts have exclusive
jurisdiction to enforce criminal and civil liabilities created by Securities Exchange Act of
1934); 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1988) (federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction in admiralty,
maritime and cases involving prizes); 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1988) (federal courts have exclu-
sive jurisdiction in suits arising under the patent, copyright, and trademark laws); 28 U.S.C.
§ 1346(b) (1988) (federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over certain claims against the
United States as defendant); 28 U.S.C. § 1351 (1988) (federal courts have exclusive juris-
diction to hear civil proceedings against certain diplomats).
The purpose of such exclusive federal jurisdiction is to ensure proper enforcement of
federal laws. In cases in which the federal Constitution creates a private right, the effect of
exclusive federal jurisdiction is to provide claimants with a federal forum in which to en-
force that right. See Martin H. Redish & John E. Muensch, Adjudication of Federal Causes of
Action in State Court, 75 MICH. L. REv. 311, 329-30 (1976). If Congress were to attempt to
deny both federal and state court enforcement of a constitutional right, it would hardly be
ensuring its optimal enforcement. In some cases, another acceptable reason for exclusion
might be available; but rendering a constitutional right unenforceable is not a constitution-
ally legitimate end of any government.
77. See Hart, supra note 2, at 1401-02. Despite Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985), a case which dramatically enhanced Congress's ability to regu-
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Despite Hart's plausible deus ex machina of state court enforce-
ment for federal rights, he saw complete congressional power to close
the lower federal courts to claims of constitutional rights as suffi-
ciently troubling to warrant a careful analysis of the contrary case law
and to suggest repeatedly that courts should strain against reading
statutes as removing jurisdiction over constitutional claims. 78  Many
later commentators offer support for Hart in concluding that federal
courts, generally, are superior enforcers of federal rights.79
B. Cases Arguably Undercutting Congress's Court-Stripping Powers
Against the record presented above in support of absolute con-
gressional powers, Hart recognizes one Court of Appeals case contain-
ing clear dictum denying complete congressional power over lower
late matters once considered within the province of state sovereignty, it is difficult to be-
lieve that Congress has power generally to close down state courts. Even after Garcia, there
may be a sufficient core of state sovereignty left to prohibit Congress's tampering with the
core structure of state government. While the Court's opinion in Garcia severely limits that
core, some passages suggest the continued existence of state sovereignty limits upon what
would otherwise be valid legislation under the Commerce Clause. See id. at 556. The
Court describes the political process as the "principal and basic limit" and states that the
issues before it "do not require us to identify or define what affirmative limits the constitu-
tional structure might impose on federal action affecting the States under the Commerce
Clause." These passages entail a recognition that there may be limits other than the "prin-
cipal one," which are not yet identified or defined. A later case, New York v. United States,
112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992), makes the existence of limits clear by striking down a provision of a
Commerce Clause-based federal law. The law was seen as intruding on state sovereignty,
because it was viewed as commandeering the state legislative process. Id. at 2419-24. Fur-
thermore, even assuming that the Court is unwilling to articulate special limits protecting
state sovereignty, the principle that the federal government is a government limited to
enumerated powers requires that federal legislative action occur under some affirmative
grant of power to the United States. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 159, 199, 4 Wheat.
316, 405 (1819). Surely an act of Congress which interfered with the basic structure of
state government in the name of federal commerce powers would be scrutinized for a real
commerce connection with greater than usual care.
78. Hart, supra note 2, at 1398-99. Hart thought courts "should use every possible re-
source of construction to avoid the conclusion" that a federal statute was intended to im-
pose such restrictions. Id.
79. E.g., Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HAgv. L. REv. 1105 (1977) (finding
federal courts superior forums for protecting federal rights); Sager, supra note 3, at 69
n. 158, 72-74 (describing the likely diminishment of controversial federal rights when left to
state court enforcement). For a wide variety of views as to the existence of parity between
the federal and state courts, including some which find less of a gap between the two sets
of courts, see the 1991 symposium on the subject in the Boston University Law Review. Erwin
Chemerinsky, Ending the Parity Debate, 71 B.U. L. REv. 593 (1991); Michael Wells, Behind the
Parity Debate: The Decline of the Legal Process Tradition in the Law of Federal Courts, 71 B.U. L.
REv. 609 (1991); Akhil R. Amar, Parity as a Constitutional Question, 71 B.U. L. Rev. 645
(1991); Susan N. Herman, Why Parity Matters, 71 B.U. L. REv. 651 (1991).
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federal courtjurisdiction and several murky Supreme Court cases pos-
sibly inconsistent with such power.80
Battaglia v. General Motors Corp."l is a decision of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit not reviewed by the Supreme
Court. There the Court of Appeals considered a group of cases in
each of which the plaintiffs claimed that a vested property right to
compensation had been destroyed, unconstitutionally, by an Act of
Congress. 2 The court in Battaglia confronted a statute which de-
prived it and all federal courts of jurisdiction to redress such claims.8"
It affirmed each of the trial court's decisions dismissing a case for
want of jurisdiction. 4 Before affirming, however, the Battaglia court
decided an issue it saw as going both to jurisdiction and to the merits:
it concluded that the property right claimed by the plaintiffs had not
vested.8 5 In the clearest dictum, the Court of Appeals then said that if
the right had vested, the jurisdictional limitation would have been un-
constitutional.8 6 In other words, the court concluded that Congress's
jurisdictional powers do not always override substantive constitutional
rights.
Initially, Hart seems to read a separate set of cases as also recog-
nizing significant limits on Congress: Wong Wing, Ng Fung Ho, and
Liphe. All of these cases involve private citizens' challenges to execu-
tive action that arguably had been made "final" by statute and, thus,
could be considered insulated from a challenge in federal court.8 7 In
all of these cases, plaintiffs filed constitutional challenges. 8 The
Supreme Court allowed lower federal courts to consider the claims
80. See supra notes 37-46 and accompanying text.
81. 169 F.2d 254 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 887 (1948). See also discussion in Hart,
supra note 2, at 1383-84.
82. Battaglia, 169 F.2d at 255-56. See The Portal to Portal Act, 29 U.S.C. § 252(a)
(1988) (purporting substantively to extinguish such claims to compensation).
83. See 29 U.S.C. § 252(d) (purporting to remove, from both federal and state courts,
jurisdiction to pass on the validity of such claims).
84. Battaglia, 169 F.2d at 255-57, 262.
85. Id. at 257-61.
86. 1d. at 257 ("We think, however, that the exercise by Congress of its control over
jurisdiction is subject to compliance with at least the requirements of the Fifth
Amendment.").
87. Hart, supra note 2, at 1387-88. In chronological order, these three cases and the
respective statutes seeming to preclude judicial review are: (1) Wong Wing v. United
States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896) (Act of Aug. 18, 1894, ch. 301, § 1, 28 Stat. 372, 390 (repealed
1966)); (2) Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922) (The General Immigration Act of
1917, ch. 29, § 19, 38 Stat. 874, 889-90 (repealed 1952)); (3) Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U.S. 557
(1922) (Act of May 27, 1872, ch. 218, § 2, 17 Stat. 162, 162 (current version at 26 U.S.C.
§ 7421(1) (1988))).
88. Wong Wing, 163 U.S. at 233-34; NgFung Ho, 259 U.S. at 281-82; Lipke, 259 U.S. at
559-60.
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despite the arguable preclusion of the challenges."9 However, as the
89. The jurisdiction limitation at issue in Wong Wingwas clear: "In every case where an
alien is excluded from admission into the United States under any law or treaty now ex-
isting or hereafter made, the decision of the appropriate immigration or custom officers, if
adverse to the admission of such alien, shall be final unless reversed on appeal to the
Secretary of the Treasury." Wong Wing, 163 U.S. at 232 (quoting the Act of Aug. 18, 1894,
ch. 301, § 1, 28 Stat. at 390). This provision was part of an Act which authorized appropria-
tions for enforcement of the Chinese Exclusion Acts of 1888, ch. 1064, 25 Stat. 504 (re-
pealed 1943). This appropriations and enforcement amendment had been previously
upheld by the Supreme Court. Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U.S. 538, 549 (1895).
The Act extending the Exclusion Acts of 1888 also provided for punishment at hard labor
for Chinese persons found to be unlawfully in the country. Act of May 5, 1892, ch. 60, § 4,
27 Stat. 25, 25 (repealed 1943).
While the Lem Moon Sing Court had refused to grant a writ of habeas corpus on the
basis of this jurisdictional limitation, Lem Moon Sing 158 U.S. at 548-50 (discussed in Wong
Wing, 163 U.S. at 232-233), the Wong Wing Court heard and ruled on a habeas petition
which challenged the conjunction of the imprisonment provision and the jurisdictional
limitation. Wong Wing, 163 U.S. at 235-38. The Court distinguished between deportation,
which does not deprive the illegal immigrant of "'life, liberty or property, without due
process of law,'" id. at 236 (quoting Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730
(1893)), and imprisonment at hard labor which, as an "infamous punishment," is reserved
for those duly convicted of a crime. Id. at 237-38. The Court concluded that, to be valid,
the provisions authorizing imprisonment at hard labor must comply with the protections
of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Because the petitioners were not afforded Fifth and
Sixth Amendment protections such as grand jury procedures and ajudicial trial, the Court
nullified the actions taken pursuant to the 1892 Act notwithstanding the jurisdictional limi-
tation. Id.
Ng Fung Ho involved a challenge to a statute which provided for deportation of aliens
upon executive orders, without judicial hearing or appeal. NgFung Ho, 259 U.S. at 278-80.
The General Immigration Act of 1917 provided in part: "In every case where any person is
ordered deported from the United States under the provisions of this Act, or of any law or
treaty, the decision of the Secretary of Labor shall be final." General Immigration Act of
1917, ch. 29, § 19, 39 Stat. 890. The Court found that no substantive constitutional ques-
tion was presented with respect to two Chinese immigrants who challenged the retroactive
application of § 19. Ng Fung Ho, 259 U.S. at 279-81. Finding only a question of statutory
construction presented, the Court dismissed the claim on the merits, allowed the jurisdic-
tional limitation to stand, and affirmed the quashing of their writ of habeas corpus. Id. at
279-81, 285. However, the Court determined that the petitioners who presented claims of
U.S. citizenry presented a question of constitutional import, id. at 281-82, and reasoned
that the power of the executive to deport without judicial review extended only to persons
who are aliens. Id. at 284. The Court concluded that the claim of citizenship, especially
when supported by sufficient evidence, entitled the claimant to the protection of the Due
Process Clause and, thus, a judicial hearing. Id. at 284-85.
Lipke challenged taxes assessed against him arising out of the sale of liquor during
Prohibition. Lipke, 259 U.S. at 558-59. The tax required a finding that liquor had been
sold or manufactured illegally and then levied double taxation and an additional penalty
upon a seller or manufacturer. See id. at 561. The Government maintained that Lipke's
suit to restrain collection was barred by the Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 169, § 10, 14 Stat. 475
(current version at 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) (1988)), which read: "No suit for the purpose of
restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court." Lipke,
259 U.S. at 5 59 -60, 560 n.1. Although recognizing the finality of the statute's language, the
Court heard the case, and concluded that the challenged provision imposed a penalty and
not a tax. Id. at 561-62. By redefining the payment levied against Lipke as a penalty, the
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Court in these cases never explicitly struck down a jurisdictional limi-
tation, it is unclear whether the Court did so sub silentio or, instead,
indulged in a presumption against reading a jurisdictional limitation
as applying to constitutional challenges.9 °
At the end of his dialogue, Hart appears to draw back his earlier
assertion that these cases forbid a tendentious jurisdictional provision
aimed at excluding constitutional rights.9 ' As he describes them, the
cases suggesting limits on Congress are comparatively weak. Battaglia
is only a circuit court case and it provides only dictum as to Congress's
powers to foreclose federal court enforcement of constitutional
rights.92 Wong Wing, Ng Fung Ho, and Lipke are Supreme Court cases,
but their meanings are not clear.93 The remainder of the cases-Shel-
don, Lauf and Lockerty--strongly support absolute or nearly absolute
congressional power.94 Almost certainly it is for this reason that Hart
concludes (presumably speaking through "A") that the record seems
to support virtually complete congressional power:
Q. . . . But suppose Congress is in dead earnest about with-
drawing general jurisdiction in a special class of cases arising
under the Constitution. Do you mean that it could only ac-
complish that by repealing section 1331 [the federal ques-
tion jurisdictional grant] in toto, on the theory that a mere
amendment might be declared unconstitutional and the
prior Section 1331 then left free to operate?
A. Well now, I'll have to stall a little. Habeas corpus aside,
I'd hesitate to say that Congress couldn't effect an unconsti-
tutional withdrawal of jurisdiction-that is, a withdrawal to
effectuate unconstitutional purposes-if it really wanted to
95
In sum, relying strongly on Sheldon, Lauf and Lockety, Hart leaves us
with what seems nearly an inescapable conclusion that Congress can
Court concluded that the jurisdictional limitation was inapplicable to the facts at hand. Id.
at 562.
90. In each case it is possible that the Court "use[d] every possible resource of con-
struction to avoid the conclusion" that Congress wished to leave such vital interests unpro-
tected by precluding judicial review. See Hart, supra note 2, at 1399; see also infra notes 111-
120 and accompanying text discussing the strong presumption against reading a statute to
preclude review of important personal interests, particularly those founded on constitu-
tional rights.
91. Hart, supra note 2, at 1398-99.
92. See supra notes 81-86 and accompanying text.
93. See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
94. See supra notes 47-79 and accompanying text.
95. Hart, supra note 2, at 1398-99.
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remove any sort of cases it wishes from the jurisdiction of the lower
federal courts.96
II. RECENT CASES AND SCHOLARSHIP
Starting in 1974, however, the Court began to suggest that con-
gressional powers over jurisdiction may not extend so far as to permit
Congress the selective exclusion of disfavored constitutional rights.
9 7
Simultaneously, some commentators began to take strong and clear
positions against congressional powers to court strip.9" Neither the
post-1974 Court nor most revisionist commentators seriously reap-
praised the view of the case law presented by Hart. The Court simply
asserted that court stripping was constitutionally questionable. The
commentators based their reappraisal on theories of the meaning of
constitutional rights or on a reassessment of the meaning of the text
of Article III.
A. The Cases: From Johnson v. Robison to Webster v. Doe
Johnson v. Robison99 was the first in this line of cases suggesting
Congress does not have unlimited court-stripping powers. 100 Robison
was classified a conscientious objector by the selective service system
and he performed the required alternative civilian service.' Later
he sought educational benefits from the Veterans' Administration.1 2
He was denied them on the ground that, under the applicable stat-
utes, those performing alternative service did not qualify.1°3 Robison
brought a class action, on behalf of certain conscientious objectors
96. Hart recognizes a possible exception for habeas corpus. Id. at 1398.
97. See infra Part II.A.
98. See supra note 15; see also infra Part II.B.
99. 415 U.S. 361 (1974).
100. In chronological order the cases are: Johnson, 415 U.S. 361 (1974); Weinberger v.
Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 762 (1975) (acknowledging that if the Social Security Act was construed
to preclude constitutional challenges it would raise a "serious constitutional question");
Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 681 n.12 (1986) (constru-
ing neither 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff nor § 1395ii to bar judicial review of Medicare program
regulations, acknowledging that to find otherwise would raise a serious constitutional ques-
tion and citing to commentators on the court-stripping debate); Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S.
592, 603 (1988) (holding that while § 102(c) of the National Security Act gives the CIA
director very broad discretion to terminate employees, it does not "exclude review of con-
stitutional claims," and acknowledging that if construed otherwise, it would raise serious
constitutional questions).
101. Johnson, 415 U.S. at 363-64.
102. Id. at 364.
103. Id. at 363. The statute clearly required that result. See 38 U.S.C. § 1652(a)(1)
(Supp. IV 1992) (enacted 1958); 38 U.S.C. § 101(21) (1958); 38 U.S.C. § 3461(a) (Supp.
IV 1992) (originally codified at 38 U.S.C. § 1661(a) (1958)).
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who had performed alternative service, against the Administrator of
Veterans' Affairs." °4 The suit sought a declaratory judgment that the
statutes, granting benefits to active duty members of the armed forces
but denying them to class members, violated both the First Amend-
ment's protection of religious freedom and the Fifth Amendment's
equal protection guarantees. °5 The Government claimed that judi-
cial review was barred by a provision of a federal statute pertaining to
veteran's benefits:
[D]ecisions of the Administrator on any question of law or
fact under any law administered by the Veterans' Administra-
tion providing benefits for veterans ... shall be final and
conclusive and no other official or court of the United States
shall have power or jurisdiction to review such decision by an
action in the nature mandamus or otherwise.
10 6
The federal district court held unconstitutional those provisions
of the statute denying conscientious objectors equal benefits.'0 7 On
expedited appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the district court's de-
cision on the substantive constitutional merits. The Supreme Court,
however, found no error in the district court's having reached the
merits. 1 8 This was true in spite of 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) which most nat-
urally could be read to deprive the federal courts of jurisdiction to
review decisions of the Veterans' Administration. In reading those
provisions rather unnaturally so as not to bar Robison's suit, the Court
relied on no single argument. It started its analysis by recognizing
and applying a presumption against reading statutes to deprive liti-
gants of judicial review in certain cases. 109 This presumption ampli-
fied the force of all of the other arguments that the provision
precluding review did not apply to Robison's claim. The Court wrote:
We consider first appellant's contention that § 211 (a)
bars federal courts from deciding the constitutionality of vet-
erans' benefits legislation. Such a construction would, of
course, raise serious questions concerning the constitutional-
ity of § 211 (a), and in such a case "it is a cardinal principle
104. Johnson, 415 U.S. at 364.
105. Id.
106. Act of Sept. 2, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-857, § 211(a), 72 Stat. 1115, 1115 (as amended
by Act of Aug. 12, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-376, § 8, 84 Stat. 787, 790) (codified at 38 U.S.C.
§ 211(a) (1988)), repealed and replaced ly similar provisions in Act of Aug. 6, 1991, Pub. L.
No. 102-83, § 2(a), 105 Stat. 378, 388-89 (codified at 38 U.S.C. § 511 (Supp. V 1993)). See
Johnson, 415 U.S. at 364-65 n.5 and accompanying text.
107. Johnson, 415 U.S. at 365.
108. Id. at 366,
109. Id. at 366-67.
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that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of
the statute is fairly possible by which the [constitutional]
question[s] may be avoided.""'
This is a remarkable statement and it has been repeated by major-
ities in several later Supreme Court cases.11 While it has long been a
general principle of American law to read a statute somewhat elasti-
cally to avoid a difficult question of its constitutionality,112 before John-
son, this particular presumption was not relied on by the courts to
influence the interpretation of arguable statutory limitations on the
jurisdiction of the lower federal courts. The presumption comes into
play where there is doubt about the constitutionality of a statutory
provision and, as we have seen, before Johnson there was little doubt as
to the validity of congressional court stripping.'1 3
This is not to deny that before 1974 the courts employed a pre-
sumption to favor judicial review of governmental action that seriously
injured individuals. This different sort of presumption was the one
put forward by Hart in his dialogue when he urged courts to resist
reading statutes as removing jurisdiction over constitutional claims.1 14
But the presumption urged by Hart is based on considerations other
110. Id. (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).
111. See cases cited supra note 100.
112. United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 369 (1971). For example,
imagine a statute which is susceptible to several readings, many of which are troubling
under first amendment analysis, but one of which is not. The presumption favoring avoid-
ing constitutional questions would favor the interpretation which raised no difficulties
even if that interpretation was somewhat strained.
113. See supra Part I.
114. See Hart, supra note 2, at 1398-99; see discussion supra note 78 and accompanying
text. It is my conjecture that Hart thought that the presumption which favors reading
statutes to permit judicial review was controlling in the following cases: Wong Wing v.
United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896); Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922); and Lipke
v. Lederer, 259 U.S. 557 (1922). Hart initially cites these cases as ones in which limits on
the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts have been declared unconstitutional. Hart,
supra note 2, at 1387-88; see also supra note 104 and accompanying text. He suggests that
the courts in question used the general federal question grant of jurisdiction to permit
consideration of whether a specific limit on their jurisdiction violated the Constitution.
Hart, supra note 2, at 1387-88. But, ultimately, Hart appears to change his mind when he
"hesitates to say" that Congress could not block assertion of specific constitutional claims if
its intent to do so is clear. Id. at 1398-99. This leads me to believe Hart ultimately saw the
Court's action in Wong Wing, Ng Fung Ho, and Lipke as not striking down the provisions
appearing to limit the jurisdiction of the courts below. More likely, Hart concluded that
the Court read the statutes to permit jurisdiction because constitutional rights were at
stake and because the statutes were insufficiently clear that they intended to forbid the
enforcement of those rights in federal trial courts. Note again that this is perfectly consis-
tent with Hart's ultimate conclusion that if Congress had been extraordinarily clear as to
its intent, it most probably could have closed the federal trial courts to any specified consti-
tutional claims.
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than risk of unconstitutionality. It is based on the general fairness of
allowing such review and the reasonable corollary assumption that
Congress presumptively wishes to act fairly.
1 15
Additionally, this "fairness"-based presumption may be justified as
providing a separation of powers counterweight to Congress's jurisdic-
tional check on the lower federal courts. Assuming its validity, com-
plete control ofjurisdiction would be Congress's main legal check on
the federal courts. The Court's political countercheck is its require-
ment that Congress be clear when it deploys its court-stripping pow-
ers.116 If a constitutionally valid removal of jurisdiction aimed at
frustration of constitutional rights is made clear, the existence of an
interbranch standoff and the high stakes involved are more easily
grasped by the voters.117 A way to ensure that Congress explicitly
states its intent to frustrate rights through jurisdictional enactments is
for the Court's to presume that Congress has no such intent unless
clearly stated.
Fairness and salutary clarity are the reasons given by Hart for
reading any possible court-stripping statute adroitly to avoid frustra-
tion of important personal interests."1 ' In 1974, the Johnson Court
cited Hart and suggested that the presumption of reviewability is
backed to a significant degree by serious doubts about the constitu-
tionality of section 211 (a) if it were to be applied to bar review in the
case before it.119 Doubts about the constitutionality of court-stripping
legislation as a justification for a presumption of judicial review is
never endorsed by Hart who "stall[s]," then "hesitate[s] to say" that
Congress could not exclude enforcement of constitutional rights from
the federal courts if it is really intent on doing so.120
Nowhere does the Johnson Court mention that Hart concludes
that Congress most likely possesses plenary power. But, based on the
materials Hart presents, his conclusion is not surprising. Not only are
Hart's constitutional-textual arguments against limits on Congress
powerful, but the case law, as he presents it, seems a juggernaught
rolling against limits on Congress. 121 At this point, based upon Hart
and the well-known cases, one is tempted to ask with Justice Scalia in
115. See Hart, supra note 2, at 1398-99.
116. Id. It is important to recall that this fairness-based presumption was used during a
time when the Court expressed little or no doubt as to the validity of court-stripping pow-
ers so vast as to permit exclusion of constitutional claims.
117. Id
118. Id.
119. Johnson, 415 U.S. at 366-67 n.8.
120. Hart, supra note 2, at 1398-99.
121. See infra Part I.A.
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Webster v. Doe:' Where is the reasonable doubt of constitutionality,
justifying tendentious, rather than straight-on statutory interpretation
of a court-stripping provision?
B. Recent Challenges in Academic Writing to Hart's View of Virtually
Unlimited Congressional Power over Lower Federal Court
Jurisdiction
As the Court seemed to open itself to the possibility of real limits
on Congress's powers, the commentators were at work, providing the-
ories to support such limits. Starting in 1974 with Theodore Eisen-
berg's article, 2 ' significant dissent from Hart's view began to appear
in the lawjournals. However, the simultaneous onset of this new wave
of scholarship with the decision of Johnson v. Robison, seems coinciden-
tal. Johnson is largely ignored by the major articles proposing new the-
oretical limits on Congress's power to exclude cases from the
jurisdiction of the lower federal courts.'2 4
This new body of literature is internally quite diverse both as to
the nature of, and the arguments for, the limits proposed. One set of
commentators argues flady that Congress cannot close off the lower
federal courts to claims of constitutional right."2 5 Of these, some ar-
gue that closing off the courts would "impermissibly burden" the right
in question.'26 Others, perhaps saying much the same thing in a dif-
ferent vocabulary, find court stripping to be an unconstitutional dis-
crimination against some constitutional rights in favor of others.' 7
A second set of commentators argue that certain cases, including
constitutional cases, cannot be excluded from the jurisdiction of the
lower federal courts if Congress has also excluded them from the
122. 486 U.S. 592, 612-14 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
123. Eisenberg, supra note 15.
124. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
125. See Brillmayer & Underhill, supra note 17, at 822 (arguing that "Congress cannot
discriminate against constitutional claims in drafting jurisdictional bills."); Sager, supra
note 3, at 78 (concluding that "the constitutional right targeted for attack is itself violated
by the jurisdictional enactment" and finding a limit on Congress's jurisdictional powers in
the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment); Tribe, supra note 15, at 141
("The Supreme Court recognized decades ago that constitutional rights would be unac-
ceptably jeopardized not only if laws could be enacted directly forbidding or penalizing
their exercise, but also if laws could be enacted making their exercise the occasion for
withholding or withdrawing benefits or privileges that would otherwise have been
available.").
126. See Sager, supra note 3, at 70, 78-79; Tribe, supra note 15, at 141-49.
127. Brillmayer & Underhill, supra note 15, at 821; Sager, supra note 3, at 70, 78-79
(finding a limit on Congress's jurisdictional powers in the equal protection component of
the Fifth Amendment as well as in the proposition that specific constitutional rights may
not be impermissibly burdened).
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Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. 2 ' On this view, either a fed-
eral trial or a state trial with ultimate Supreme Court review would
satisfy Article 111.129 In general, these commentators argue more
closely from the language and structure of Article III, than do the first
group who simply assert that substantive constitutional rights tend to
trump congressional power over federal jurisdiction.1 0
These generalizations, of course, oversimplify and mask differ-
ences of opinion between commentators in the various groups. How-
ever, this description provides a useful working notion of the nature
of the new scholarship opposing Hart's position.
Many of these scholarly arguments would gain force if the case
law concerning congressional court-stripping powers turned out to be
much more equivocal than previously portrayed and understood.'13
Were that so, Johnson would appear less as a statutory-interpretive bluff
128. Amar, supra note 15, at 238-59; Clinton, supra note 15, at 749-54. More precisely,
Clinton, unlike Amar, takes no position on the existence of limits on Congress's powers
but offers arguments which support such limits.
129. Professor Amar reads the Constitution's language-extending the judicial power to
(1) "'A LL ' cases arising under [federal law]," (2) "ALL" cases affecting ambassadors [etc.]
and (3) "ALL" cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction-as requiring either federal trial
or appellate jurisdiction in every case coming within such categories. Amar, supra note 15,
at 209, 240, 255-57, 269. That is to say, if there is no federal trial jurisdiction in such cases,
then some federal court must have appellate jurisdiction over the state tribunals which
would then hear such cases in the first instance. With the possible de facto exception of
federal habeas corpus jurisdiction, the Supreme Court alone has exercised appellatejuris-
diction over the state courts. Amar suggests the possibility, however, that lesser federal
tribunals might be empowered to hear such appeals. Id. at 269; see also Preble Stolz, Federal
Review of State Court Decisions of Federal Questions: The Need for Appellate Capacity, 64 CAL. L.
Rv. 943, 945-48 (1976) (concluding that many forms of lower federal court appellate re-
view of state court decisions would be constitutional).
130. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
131. Because Amar reads the Constitution to permit Congress to exclude even federal
constitutional claims from the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts, as long as the state
courts are open and the Supreme Court can review their decisions, see supra note 129-130,
the bearing of cases such as Johnson v. Robison and Lauf v. Shinner on his thesis is less
obvious. Those cases deal with the question of whether a lower federal court must be open
to constitutional claims. This question has no answer under Amar's analysis unless we first
determine the availability of state trial courts and Supreme Court review.
Presumably Amar would find Laufs approval of a jurisdictional restriction problem-
atic only if it blocked a constitutional right to an injunction, and then only if the injunction
were unavailable in a state court proceeding reviewable by the Supreme Court. It is the
received view, and a sound one, that Congress cannot close off state courts to constitu-
tional claims if the lower federal courts also have been closed. See supra notes 76-77 and
accompanying text. Thus, the state courts most likely were open in Lauf and that is suffi-
cient to justify its result under Amar's theory.
For the same reason I believe that Amar would find Johnson v. Robison troubling.
There the Court suggested that barring a plaintiff's constitutional claim from the federal
trial courts would raise serious constitutional questions. What complicates matters slightly
is that Johnson involves review of federal administrative action. Congress might prefer such
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and more as a real threat to strike down court-stripping limits which
frustrate constitutional rights, should occasion to do so arise. And
should that occasion arise, a majority of the Court could limit Con-
gress's powers with less of a rupture from precedent than the current
understandings of the case law suggests. In this light, a majority of
Justices might find in the new scholarship a congenial and more plau-
sible array of arguments supporting limits on Congress's powers of
exclusion.
III. ARMSTRONG V. UNITED STATE_." A SUPREME COURT DECISION
STRIKING DOWN A COURT-STRIPPING MEASURE
While the case law record as traditionally presented includes no
case striking down a court-stripping measure, in fact such cases exist.
One of them, Armstrong v. United States'52 was decided by the Supreme
Court. Armstrong was one of two important and related cases, bearing
on Congress's powers over the federal courts, which emerged from
the Civil War and its immediate aftermath.' 3 It should not be surpris-
ing that issues of Congress's powers over the federal courts emerged
during Reconstruction. Constitutional decisions, particularly those in-
volving significant separation of powers issues, often occur during
times of great national stress, such as the founding, the Civil War, Re-
construction, and the New Deal.' 34 In this section I discuss Armstrong
and the related cases, United States v. Kleinl3 5 and Witkowski v. United
review not to occur at all. However, if it must occur, Congress surely would prefer review of
administrative action to occur in federal rather than state court.
Consequently, I believe that, had the Court in Johnson employed Amar's approach, it
would have stated (1) that there was a substantial constitutional argument that the state
courts must be open for initial review of constitutional claims if the federal trial courts are
closed, (2) that in the present circumstances Congress would have preferred federal to
state review, and therefore (3) that the Court read the statute to permit federal review so as
to avoid a substantial constitutional issue whose resolution might lead to the alternative
least desired by Congress.
132. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 154 (1872).
133. The other case, which does not involve court stripping, is United States v. Klein, 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872).
134. Shortly after the founding of the Republic, Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 87, 1
Cranch 137 (1803), established the power of federal courts to review the constitutionality
of acts of Congress and, possibly, the power to review acts of the Executive Branch as well.
This important issue, not explicitly addressed by the Constitution, came to a head in the
midst of the first partisan power struggle for control of the new government. As for the
many important cases formed under the political and social pressures of the Civil War,
Reconstruction, and the New Deal, see Kermit L. Hall ed., The Oxford Companion to the
Supreme Court of the United States, 152-214, 711-12, 584-85 (respectively, the entries for
the three periods in chronological order) (1993).
135. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872). For a full discussion of Klein, see HART & WECHSLER
3D, supra note 9, at 368-69; GERALD GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL
[VOL. 54:132
FEDERAL JURISDICTION
States,136 to offer a revised view of the case law record concerning Con-
gress's jurisdictional powers.
A. The Context of the Armstrong Decision
The Abandoned and Captured Property Act,137 enacted during
the Civil War, spawned litigation that resulted in one well-recognized
Supreme Court case, United States v. Klein, limiting Congress's powers
to restrict the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Traditionally read,
Klein forbids Congress from engaging in certain forms of jurisdic-
tional tampering. 138 But Klein deals with only one unusual sort of tam-
pering. As a result, Klein generally has been read as saying nothing
about the focus of this article: court stripping. So read, Klein does not
address the power of the Congress to withdraw a category of cases
from the jurisdiction of the federal courts. 13 9 Rather, it addresses only
the distinctly narrower problem of Congress's purportedly treating
the federal courts as puppets, by using a specific 'jurisdictional limita-
tion" to dictate substantively unconstitutional results in a category of
cases over which the courts have been given jurisdiction.1 40
The crucial distinction is one between what I call "puppeteering"
and what is generally known as court stripping. The mainstream, anti-
puppeteering reading of Klein would, for example, forbid Congress
from conferring on the federal district courts the power to hear fed-
eral criminal prosecutions while depriving them of 'jurisdiction" to
consider a defendant's First Amendment defense.' 4 ' So read, Klein
does not, however, forbid court stripping, that is the closing down of
the federal courts to all cases in which a plaintiff asserts a cause of
action founded on a constitutional right, e.g., the First Amend-
ment. 1 42 On this view, Klein offers protection only once Congress has
called the lower federal courts into play in a category of cases; it pro-
vides no guarantee that Congress will open the courts to any particu-
lar set of cases.
LAw 41-42 (12 ed. 1991); Sager, supra note 3, at 29, 70-77; Young, supra note 23, at 1189-
1262.
136. 7 Ct. Cl. 393 (1872).
137. Ch. 120, § 3, 12 Stat. 820, 820 (1863). For a complete discussion of the operation
of this and other acts as they led to the crisis which spawned the Klein and Armstrong cases
discussed in this section, see Young I, supra note 23, at 1197-1209. In particular, see id. at
1197 n.43.
138. SeeYoung, supra note 23, at 1213-33.
139. Id. at 1219-22.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id
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Klein's companion case, Armstrong v. United States, is not discussed
by the modern Supreme Court and commentators.1 43 In Armstrong,
the Court struck down a statutory provision designed to eliminate
lower federal court jurisdiction over a category of cases.' 44 Conse-
quently, Armstrong not only raises the validity of congressional court
stripping, but also constitutes a holding against that sort of jurisdic-
tional regulation. Consequently, it is a precedent against broad con-
gressional control of lower federal court jurisdiction, although
admittedly it is a precedent weakened to some degree by its age and
by the state of legal theory at the time it was decided.
Klein and Armstrong arose out of the same general statutory and
case law matrix. Both dealt with the right of pardoned Confederate
sympathizers to compensation for property seized by Union troops be-
hind enemy lines during the Civil War.14 The claims were made
under the Abandoned and Captured Property Acts 146 which provided
for the compensation of former owners of captured property if they
had remained loyal to the Union. 4 7 Before Armstrong and Klein, in
United States v. Padelford,148 the Court had read the Act as permitting
recovery by those who in fact had not been loyal but were later
pardoned.1 49 In angry response to this interpretation, the Radical
Republicans in Congress successfully forced through legislation in
1870 having two features, one relevant to Klein and one to Arm-
strong."' While both features were written in jurisdictional terms, the
first feature was a puppeteering provision while the second was a
court-stripping measure.
The puppeteering provision of the 1870 Act provided that a
pardoned, but disloyal, claimant who had won a judgment in the
143. Armstrong is, however, mentioned in Young, supra note 23, at 1214 n.135 and HART
& WECHSLER 3D, supra note 9, at 369 n.5. See supra Part II and notes 15-17, 100 and accom-
panying text for discussions of recent cases and scholarship which cast doubt on Congress's
power to court strip.
144. See Armstrong v. United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 154 (1872).
145. See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 136-44 (1872); Armstrong, 80 U.S.
(13 Wall.) at 155-56. For a description and discussion of the Civil War legislation in play in
these cases, see Young, supra note 23, 1197-1209.
146. Ch. 120, 12 Stat. 820 (1863).
147. See id, § 3; see also K/e/n, 80 U.S. at 136-44; Armstrong 80 U.S. at 155-56.
148. 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 531 (1870).
149. Id. at 542-43 ("[11f the property had been seized before the oath was taken, the
faith of the government was pledged to its restoration upon the taking of the oath in good
faith."). For a discussion of Padeford, see Young, supra note 23, at 1201-03.
150. See Act of July 12, 1870, ch. 251, 16 Stat. 230, 235 [hereinafter 1870 Act]. See also
Young, supra note 23, 1203-09 (describing the Act as a Radical Republican attempt to avoid
both the statutory interpretation and the constitutional implications of the Padelford
decision).
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lower federal courts, must have it reversed by the Supreme Court.'- 1
This was the measure struck down in Klein. 52 The measure did not
involve court stripping. The Supreme Court had been given, not de-
nied, jurisdiction to act; that jurisdiction, however, was shaped to con-
trol the Court's decision on the merits. It was a jurisdiction only to
reverse ajudgment based on a pardon, regardless of the Court's analy-
sis of the merits of the constitutional claim.
153
Armstrong is a different case. It involved the second feature of the
1870 Act, a court-stripping provision. This provision deprived the fed-
eral trial courts of the power to hear cases brought by the pardoned
disloyal:
[N]o pardon ... shall be admissible in evidence on the part
of any claimant ... [in any court under the Act, and] . . .
such pardon and acceptance shall be taken and deemed...
conclusive evidence that such person did take part in... the
late rebellion.., and on proof of such pardon and acceptance...
the jurisdiction of the court in the case shall cease, and the court
shall forthwith dismiss the suit of such claimant.154
In Armstrong, the Supreme Court, citing Klein, reversed the dis-
missal of a pardon recipient's claim for captured cotton and re-
manded the case for consideration on the merits.55 This disposition
was inconsistent with the court-stripping portion of the 1870 Act that
purported to exclude claims of pardoned disloyals from the jurisdic-
tion of the lower federal courts.1 56 Consequently, Armstrong held that
at least some court-stripping measures are unconstitutional.
151. 1870 Act, 16 Stat. at 235. The relevant language reads: "And in all cases where
judgment shall have been heretofore rendered in the court of claims in favor of any claim-
ant [who was disloyal but subsequently pardoned] ... the Supreme Court shall, on appeal,
have no further jurisdiction of the cause, and shall dismiss the same for want ofjurisdic-
tion." Id. For the proposition that the phrase "dismiss the cause" meant that the Supreme
Court must, in effect, reverse the U.S. Court of Claims, see Klein, 80 U.S. at 145-46; Young,
supra note 23, at 1219-24.
152. Klein, 80 U.S. at 146-48.
153. See 1870 Act, 16 Stat. at 235; see also supra note 151 for relevant language.
154. 1870 Act, 16 Stat. at 235 (emphasis added).
155. Armstrong v. United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 154, 155-56 (1872), rev k5 Ct. Cl. 623
(1869). For a Court of Claims decision anticipating Armstrong by its use of Klein to ignore
the court-stripping provisions of the 1870 Act, see Waring v. United States, 7 Ct. Cl. 501,
504 (1872) ("[U]nder the principles laid down in the recent opinion of the Supreme
Court in Klein's Case, it is our duty to give effect to [the presidential pardon] ... ."). For a
discussion of Waring, see Sager, supra note 3, at 29 n.31, and Young, supra note 23, at 1222-
23 n.179.
156. See supra text accompanying note 154. The 1870 Act was not in force when Arm-
strong's case was dismissed in the Court of Claims and hence was not the ground for that
court's dismissal. See Armstrong, 5 Ct. Cl. at 625-26 (dismissing the suit on the ground of
Armstrong's disloyalty). When Armstrong's appeal was before the Supreme Court, the
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Armstrong reached its holding summarily, offering no indication
as to its reasoning other than a citation to Klein.157 However, a Court
of Claims decision shortly after Armstrong, Witkowski v. United States,'
reached a result identical to that in Armstrong and provides an analysis
of the issues which, though confused, is more detailed than that of-
fered by Armstrong. Although we cannot be sure, it is possible that the
Witkowski court's contemporaneous discussion of the issues provides a
window into the Supreme Court's reasoning in Armstrong.
Witkowski sued under the Abandoned and Captured Property
Act to recover the proceeds of cotton seized from him by the Union
Army and later sold by the United States.159 Although he maintained
his innocence of giving aid and comfort to the rebellion, he offered a
presidential pardon as an alternative ground for finding the loyalty
required by the Act as a prerequisite to reimbursement.1 60 The Court
of Claims originally dismissed Witkowski's suit.16 On the strength of
the intervening Supreme Court decision in Klein, the Court of Claims
granted Witkowski's motion for reconsideration and awarded him
judgment. 6 2
Although Klein dealt with puppeteering and not court strip-
ping,163 the Court of Claims used Klein to justify hearing Witkowski's
case, 164 a case which the 1870 Act clearly excluded from its jurisdic-
1870 Act was in force. Armstrong 80 U.S. at 155-56. There is, and was at the time the
Supreme Court decided Armstrong, a requirement that federal courts apply new and other-
wise constitutional statutes to cases pending before it. See United States v. The Schooner
Peggy, 5 U.S. 64, 68, 1 Cranch 103, 109-10 (1801); see also HART & WECHSLER 3D, supra note
9, at 368-69 & n.4 (recognizing "the ancient principle, clear since the decision in [The
Schooner Peggy] that the courts are obligated to apply law (otherwise valid) as they find it
at the time of their decision, including when a case is on review, the time of appellate judgment.")
(emphasis added); Young, supra note 23, at 1240 & nn.238-41. Hence, if Congress validly
could have excluded pardonees from the Court of Claims, the Supreme Court would have
affirmed the Court of Claims dismissal on the independent and intervening ground of the
1870 Act. Instead the Court remanded, ignoring the jurisdictional restriction as unconsti-
tutional. Armstrong 80 U.S. at 155-56.
It is important also to note that the Court so held in spite of its own recent recognition
of the Court of Claims as an inferior court of the United States constituted under Article
III of the Constitution and therefore subject to any valid congressional regulation of juris-
diction under that Article. Klein, 80 U.S. at 144-45. See infra note 171 for further discussion
of this point.
157. Armstrong 80 U.S. at 155.
158. 7 Ct. Cl. 393 (1872).
159. Id. at 393.
160. Id. at 394.
161. Id. at 393-94.
162. Id. at 393-94, 399.
163. For the meaning of this distinction, see supra notes 141-144 and accompanying text.
164. Id. at 396-99.
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tion. 165 The Court of Claims opinion accompanying Witkowski's trial
on remand shows understandable confusion about the meaning of
Klein:
It is the unquestionable intent of [Klein] that the statute is
unconstitutional because it interferes with the proper admin-
istration of justice in the judicial department of the Govern-
ment, of which the Court of Claims is an element; and that
while Congress may withdraw cases from its jurisdiction, or prescribe
the terms and conditions upon which actions may be brought, yet
Congress cannot prescribe to it a rule of decision, nor interfere with
the proper exercise of judicial functions.166
Well, which is it? In passing the Abandoned and Captured Prop-
erty Acts has Congress permissibly "withdraw[n]" claims based on
presidential pardons from the Court of Claims' jurisdiction or has it
"interfere[d] with the proper exercise of judicial function?" Does
Congress have plenary powers to remove cases from thejurisdiction of
the lower federal courts or are those powers constrained in some
ways? If the powers are constrained what are the limits?
The court-stripping section of the 1870 Act states that the Court
of Claims shall have no jurisdiction to hear a suit seeking proceeds of
abandoned and captured property brought by one who accepted a
pardon.1 67 Yet, the Court of Claims in Witkowski proceeded to resolve
the merits. 168 On the surface at least, the most plausible way to recon-
cile Witkowski's result (judicial jurisdiction over claims despite a clear
statute to the contrary) and its seemingly contrary language ("Con-
gress may withdraw cases from [the court's] jurisdiction") is to assume
that the court recognized limits to the latter congressional power. In
short, some measures, despite their form, were not bona fide jurisdic-
tional regulations because they were designed to frustrate constitu-
tional rights. Similar reasoning must underlie the Supreme Court's
decision in Armstrong.
B. Significance of the Armstrong and Witkowski Decisions
What did these old opinions mean when written and what is their
force in today's debate over Congress's jurisdictional powers? For ex-
ample, do they significantly support the suggestion of limits on Con-
165. 1870 Act, 16 Stat. at 235; see also supra notes 151-154 and accompanying text.
166. Witkowski, 7 Ct. C1. at 397 (emphasis added).
167. See 1870 Act, 16 Stat. at 235; see also supra text accompanying note 154.
168. Witkowski, 7 Ct. C1. at 399.
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gress's jurisdictional powers made by Supreme Court majorities since
Johnson v. Robinson169 and decried by Justice Scalia in Webster v. Doe?1 7
There are several seemingly plausible ways to harmonize Waring,
Witkowski, and Armstrong with the later cases that proclaim unlimited
congressional power-ways that would detract from Armstrong's power
as a countervailing case. There are two possible explanations I find
especially unconvincing. One would view the implications of Arm-
strong, Waring, and Witkowski as limited to the Court of Claims, the
court whose jurisdiction was in question in those cases. 171 The other
would explain the result in those cases based on the inseparability of
the Court of Claims jurisdictional provisions of the 1870 Act from
those held unconstitutional in Klein.1
72
169. 415 U.S. 361 (1974). For other cases, see supra note 100.
170. 486 U.S. 592, 612-14 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
171. The argument would be that the Court of Claims is a special court and that deter-
minations concerning its jurisdiction are not generalizable to other federal courts. Lend-
ing some support to this view is the Supreme Court's opinion in Williams v. United States,
289 U.S. 533 (1933), which determined that the Court of Claims was not an Article III
court. 289 U.S. at 580-81. However, Williams has been criticized as incoherent. HART &
WECHSLER 21, supra note 9, at 398-99 (characterizing Williams as an "intellectual disaster"
because of its conclusion that the Court of Claims was not an Article III court, even though
all of its cases were within the judicial power as defined in Article III).
More importantly, the Williams view of the Court of Claims was not the law when Klein
was decided. Indeed, Williams repudiated statements made in Klein itself that the Court of
Claims was an Article III court: "The Court of Claims is thus constituted one of those
inferior courts which Congress authorizes. . . ." United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.)
128, 145 (1872); seeYoung, supra note 23, at 1255-56. Furthermore, it seems a safe assump-
tion that Congress has more authority to limit the jurisdiction of Article I courts than that
of Article III courts. If the Court of Claims had been deemed an Article I court in 1872,
then presumably the Armstrong court would have been even less deferential to restrictions
on Article III courts.
172. This argument would be that the court-stripping provision was not held unconstitu-
tional in Armstrong, but rather held inseparable from the puppeteering provision struck
down in Klein. However, Armstrong is not written in terms suggesting inseparability, but
rather in terms of the Court of Claims' obligation to enforce the underlying pardon-based
substantive rights stemming from the Presidential pardon. See Armstrong v. United States,
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 154, 156 (1872) ("[The pardon] was a public act of which all courts of
the United States are bound to take notice, and to which all courts are bound to give
effect."). Nowhere did the Court of Claims in Witkowski suggest that the Armstrong decision
was based on separability. See Witkowski, 7 Ct. Cl. at 393-94. Finally, legislative intent deter-
mines the effectiveness of one portion of a statute when another is struck down on grounds
of inseparability. From the debates in Congress, there can be no doubt that Congress
would have intended the court-stripping provision of the Act to stand even if that portion
directed to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court failed constitutional scrutiny.
SeeYoung, supra note 23, at 1203-10 (indicating the intensity of Congress's desire to inflict
severe penalties on Confederate sympathizers whose loyalty was based only on pardons and
describing the care with which the statute's language was fashioned to achieve this result in
both the Supreme Court and the Court of Claims).
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There are, on the surface, two more plausible ways to harmonize
Armstrong with broad court-stripping powers. One proposes that the
Supreme Court was unaware of the jurisdictional language of the stat-
ute and consequently did not intend to override the powers of Con-
gress in that realm. The second assumes that the Armstrong Court
specifically construed the statute in a way permitting it to avoid decid-
ing the constitutionality of the jurisdictional limit, thereby rendering
Armstrong a statutory interpretation case and not a precedent on the
constitutionality of court-stripping legislation.
Both these suggestions ultimately are unpersuasive. First, there is
little question that the Court was familiar with the language of the
statute, and with the intent of its drafters to extinguish pardon rights
either directly or by means of jurisdictional limitations.1 73 Second, it
is improbable that Armstrong really rested on sub silentio statutory in-
terpretation-on one which avoided the constitutional-jurisdictional
question by reading the 1870 Act to permit Armstrong's suit in the
Court of Claims. This is so precisely because the jurisdictional provi-
sions of the 1870 Act were directed only to persons asserting pardon
rights and were clearly intended to prevent their enforcement.' 74 It is
difficult to imagine a more clearly intentional and specifically focused
attempt on the part of Congress to stop federal trial courts from hear-
ing claims made under the Constitution. 175
173. Justice Chase wrote the opinion of the Court in United States v. Padelford, 76 U.S.
(9 Wall.) 531 (1870), Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872), and Armstrong, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.)
154 (1872). He was one of the most politically minded Justices in the history of the Court.
He had been a state governor, a United States Senator, a member of Lincoln's cabinet and
had serious Presidential ambitions. HENRYJ. ABRAHAM,JusTICES AND PRESIDENTS 122-23 (3d
ed. 1992); 6 CHARLES FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
RECONSTRUCrION AND REUNION Pt. 1, 13-18, 22-32, 515-57, 1465-67 (1971). The 1870 Act
was designed to negate the effects of his own opinion in Padelford, which had permitted
recovery by the disloyal but pardoned under the Abandoned and Captured Property Act.
See Padelford, 76 U.S. at 537. It seems likely that Justice Chase knew of the debate on the
1870 Act, attacking his Padelford opinion, soon after that debate appeared in the Congres-
sional Globe (the precursor of the Congressional Record). See CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d
Sess. 3809-25 (1870) (containing statements making clear the backers' attempt to avoid
Supreme Court decisions according pardonees rights to recover property). See also Young,
supra note 23, at 1203-09.
In addition, shortly before Armstrong was decided in 1872, the Court in Klein had taken
the extreme step of ruling a portion of the 1870 Act unconstitutional. Klein, 80 U.S., at
146-48. In doing so the Court would naturally have scrutinized the Act and its legislative
history in the Congressional Globe and seen Congress's attack on justice Chase's earlier work.
For these reasons, it is impossible to believe that justice Chase and his Court were not
aware of the objects of the 1870 Act at least by the time of Klein and Armstrong.
174. See supra notes 151-154 and accompanying text.
175. See Young, supra note 23, at 1203-09.
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Finally, a more serious objection to Armstrong's power as a coun-
tervailing case questions not its status as a holding against court strip-
ping, but rather the degree of its force as holding. At the time of
Armstrong, the Court may not have possessed a theoretical framework
that would allow it to distinguish between Klein-style puppeteering
(controlling the result of a case by manipulating the exercise of juris-
diction) and Armstrongstyle court stripping (prohibiting the exercise
ofjurisdiction at all in a particular case). This theoretical net was not
clearly cast over the cases until 1953 by Hart in his dialogue. 176 It is
possible that, if the Court had considered this distinction, it would
have decided Armstrong differently. It might have validated the court-
stripping provision as significantly different from the puppeteering
which occurred in Klein. But, it is also possible that the Court would
have rejected the significance of the distinction, deciding Armstrong
precisely as it did on the ground that both court stripping and pup-
peteering are forms of unconstitutional jurisdictional tampering.
All of this is speculation. Armstrong did strike down a court-strip-
ping provision. While Armstrong is not as forceful as it would have
been if it had considered and specifically rejected Hart's distinction
between court stripping and puppeteering, at a minimum one must
count Armstrong as evidence that the Court has been willing to strike
down a statute excluding a class of claims from the lower federal
courts' jurisdiction. One can debate the proper weight of Armstrong
and allied Court of Claims cases given their position as relatively early
cases in a long current of cases on congressional power. What is hard
to dispute, however, is the significance of Armstron's holding if it were
followed today. It seems impossible to distinguish, in any meaningful
way, the plaintiff in Armstrong from plaintiffs today who might seek
federal court enforcement of modern constitutional rights, such as
busing or abortion rights, despite a statute which purports to close off
the federal courts.
Where does Armstrong leave the debate over Congress's powers?
Clearly Armstrong stands as one holding that Congress cannot close off
constitutional rights from lower federal court enforcement. Nonethe-
less, the juggernaught of the later hundred-year history, cited by Hart
176. Hart strongly pressed the distinction between court stripping, on the one hand,
and using the lower federal courts as puppets, on the other. Hart, supra note 2, at 1372-74.
"[W] hen the way of exercising jurisdiction is in question, rather than its denial, the consti-
tutional tests are different." Id. at 1372. See also supra notes 137-156 and accompanying
text. The distinction is not self evident. It often takes some care to explain it to my law
students and at least one important commentator has quarreled with the distinction. See
Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. Rav. 1, 22-24
(1983).
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as standing for the contrary, remains. 177 Or does it? Below I reassess
the traditional cases described by Hart, focusing on Lauf v. E.G. Shin-
ner & Co., t 78 the case he offers as the strongest supporting complete
congressional control. A rereading of Lauf, coupled with the counter-
vailing effect of Armstrong's case, renders the case law record a less
formidable obstacle to the new scholarship arguing against the validity
of court stripping.
IV. THE FORCE OF THE PRE-1974 CASES RECONSIDERED
A. Background: The Conventional View that Lauf v. E.G. Shinner &
Co. Upheld Exclusion of Constitutional Claims from the Federal
Trial Courts
Certainly there are powerful statements in the case law, both
before and after Reconstruction, to the effect that Congress has the
power to exclude any claims that it wishes to specify from the jurisdic-
tion of the lower federal courts.179 The statements are broad, drawing
no distinction between the exclusion of cases asserting constitutional
claims and other cases. Contrary to suggestions in the best regarded
commentary, however, it is doubtful whether any of the statements
range beyond dicta into holding.
For example, as discussed in Part I, Sheldon v. Sill8 ° is not a hold-
ing as to constitutional claims.' 81 The plaintiff in Sheldon presented
177. See supra Part I.
178. 303 U.S. 323 (1938).
179. See supra Part I.A. For an additional earlier statement, see Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S.
265, 276-77, 3 How. 236, 245 (1845).
180. 49 U.S. 453, 8 How. 441 (1850).
181. See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text. Michael C. Dorf's Dicta and Article III,
142 U. PA. L. REv. 1997 (1994), was published as this Article went to press. Dorf's piece is a
useful exploration of the abstractly contradictory requirements that (1) a judge decide no
more than the case before her, and (2) she do so based on general principles which will
have authority in later cases. Id. at 1997. Dorf rejects a continuum view that would hold
that we should recognize degrees of authoritativeness. He opts instead for a system which
sorts statements into the bins of dicta and holding. Id. at 2049-53. My own view has always
resembled the view Doff rejects. But Dorf has convinced me that the system for determin-
ing degrees of authoritativeness may not be one simple continuum, but something more
complex. Dorf's view seems to be that we have to credit judges' explanations of how they
decide cases even if those explanations are broad and, consequently, control more of the
future than other possible explanations. Id. at 2043-49. It seems to me that the degree to
which we do so does and should depend on a host of factors, including how broadly the
explanation ranges and what is at stake. These factors probably are never reducible to an
algorithm. Dorf himself makes concessions to problems of overgenerality:
Indeed, even if we accept a fairly abstract characterization of the holding of the
first case, that does not preclude exceptions. "A rule that ends with the word
'unless . . .' is still a rule." Nor is it obvious that the exceptions must be articu-
lated along with the governing rule or principle. In the first case, the precedent
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no federal constitutional claim as to the merits of his case, 18 2 there-
fore none was frustrated by the Court's enforcement of a technical
limit on diversity jurisdiction. Moreover, in Lockerty v. Phillips,' the
Supreme Court read the case before it as not presenting the question
of Congress's power completely to exclude a federal constitutional
right from effective enforcement in the federal trial courts.18 4
court may reason at a very high level of abstraction, so that its reasoning appears
to apply to a broad range of circumstances not presented or contemplated.
When a litigant later presents to the court its earlier ruling and asks for an unjust
or even absurd result, stare decisis does not require that the court oblige.
Id. at 2057 (footnote omitted).
As applied to this Article, Dorfs analysis might cause us to view Sheldon as a holding
that court stripping is valid. On this view we would credit Sheldon's statement of its ration-
ale-courts created by statute etc.-as broad enough not only to decide Sheldon but also a
later case in which a jurisdictional limitation purported to block a constitutional claim.
On the other hand, Doff might find that Sheldon is dicta as to the exclusion of contitu-
tional claims, on the ground that the overgenerality of its statements suggest implied
exceptions.
Regardless of how Dorf would read Sheldon, I believe that Sheldon's general statements,
made in a context where no substantive constitutional claim is blocked, should be viewed
as having significantly reduced authoritativeness in later cases involving constitutional
claims. This is what I mean when I say that Sheldon's statements are dicta at most and less
than that if not intended to cover constitutional claims. Even if Sheldon did consider and
intended statements to cover cases asserting constitutional claims, its seems to me that it
should matter that the court was not asked to refuse to consider such a claim.
I admire Dorf's effort which has made me resolve to rethink these matters carefully.
What is clear to me now, is that I have less enthusiasm than Doff for science-like rules
aimed at more predictable determinations of authoritativeness. I would place more em-
phasis on a policy-informed art of determining authoritativeness. In such a system, the one
that we have, there is a balance between predictability and a flexible responsiveness to a
host of considerations.
182. Of course, on appeal, the plaintiff did argue that the statute, forbidding federal
trial jurisdiction in his case despite diversity of citizenship was unconstitutional as inconsis-
tent with Article III's provision for federal jurisdiction in suits between citizens of different
states. Sheldon, 49 U.S. at 448-59, 8 How. at 446. The substantive merits of his suit, how-
ever, were based on state law. Id. at 462-63, 8 How. at 449-50; see also supra notes 47-51 and
accompanying text. In many disputes involving federal statutes there is a jurisdictional
limitation which was or could be attacked as constitutionally invalid. I assume, however,
that generally such attacks are meritless. In other words,jurisdictional limitations are valid
if they exclude statutory interests which have not yet become vested constitutional rights.
If Congress has the substantive power to repeal a litigant's interest, I see no reason why
Congress cannot accomplish the same result by a jurisdictional limitation. See Battaglia v.
General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254, 257 (2d Cir.) ("We think, however, that the exercise
by Congress of its control over jurisdiction is subject to compliance with at least the re-
quirements of the Fifth Amendment."), cert denied, 385 U.S. 887 (1948); see also supra notes
81-86 and accompanying text. The harder issue-the one explored in this article-is
whether limitations on the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts become unconstitutional
when they result in excluding constitutional claims from those courts.
183. 319 U.S. 182 (1943).
184. See supra notes 61-72 and accompanying text.
[VOL. 54:132
FEDERAL JURISDICTION
As described in the scholarly literature, it is Lauf which seems to
provide the strongest support for broad congressional powers to court
strip.185 This is so because the most influential commentators present
Laufas a holding-as a case in which the Supreme Court finally shows
that it is willing to act on all of the dicta in cases such as Sheldon.18 6 In
Lauf the Supreme Court seems to order a lower federal court to dis-
miss a plaintiffs suit for an injunction, a remedy to which the plaintiff
claimed entitlement on due process grounds. 87 The Supreme Court
seems to instruct the lower court to deny injunctive relief on the
ground that any due process claim to an injunction would be ex-
cluded from the federal trial courts by the Norris-LaGuardia Act's'
provisions which strip away federal district court jurisdiction to grant
injunctions in labor disputes.189
This is the view suggested by Hart in his foundational article 9 '
and in his fine casebook written with Herbert Wechsler. 9 ' Both
works strongly indicate that Lauf contains a holding supporting the
most generous view of congressional power over jurisdiction.' 92 After
reciting earlier cases as finding (1) certain substantive due process
rights protecting business from governmental interference, 9 3 and (2)
a subsidiary due process right to an injunction in order to protect that
primary right," 4 the casebook continues:
Did the fact that the Norris-LaGuardia Act, as interpreted,
merely limited federal jurisdiction render these due process
arguments (whatever their validity) irrelevant? This was the
view of the reports of the Judiciary Committees .... The
position was apparently sustained by the Supreme Court in
Lauf v. Shinner ... Justice Roberts saying: "There can be no
question of the power of Congress thus to define and limit
the jurisdiction of the inferior courts of the United
States."1 9 5
185. See supra notes 53-60 and accompanying text and infra notes 191-195 and accompa-
nying text.
186. See supra notes 53-60. In this Part, I offer two arguments which dispute the tradi-
tional view of Laufs holding.
187. See infra notes 198-209 and accompanying text.
188. 49 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1988).
189. See infra notes 198-209 and accompanying text.
190. Hart, supra note 2, at 1363 n.7.
191. HART & WECHSLER IST, supra note 9, at 295.
192. See supra notes 190-191.
193. HART & WECHSLER lST, supra note 9, at 295 (citing Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1
(1915) and Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908)).
194. Id. (citing Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921)).
195. Id. (emphasis added) (footnote and citations omitted). This reading of Lauf
emerges from a combined reading of a passage in Hart's dialogue, see supra text accompa-
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B. The Conventional View Reconsidered
In each of the two subparts below, I will make an argument dis-
puting Hart's reading of Lauf as a strong holding. The first argument
is that Laufcan be seen as either dicta or as making no statement at all
on Congress's power to exclude constitutional claims from the lower
federal courts. 96 The second argument-less interesting but worth
considering-concedes, for purposes of argument, that Lauf is a hold-
ing, but sees it as entitled to less than full precedential weight. This
latter argument, based on the demise of substantive due process in
1938, has been suggested, if not clearly made, by other commenta-
tors.19 7 I simply want to evaluate it, add some new material which
supports it, and then mildly endorse it.
1. Lauf Holding Reconsidered.-On the surface at least, Lauf
seems to contain a holding that Congress's jurisdictional powers per-
mit it to exclude constitutional claims. The plaintiff made a due pro-
cess claim to an injunction on the merits and urged additionally that
the Constitution did not permit Congress to use its jurisdictional pow-
ers to exclude actions seeking such injunctions from lower federal
court jurisdiction.'98 The Supreme Court remanded, instructing the
federal trial court to dismiss any claim for an injunction to which the
nying note 60, and from a passage that appears in all three editions of his splendid
casebook, see infta text accompanying note 249. See HART & WECHSLER 1st, supra note 9, at
295; HART & WECHSLER 2 D, supra note 9, at 316-17; HART & WECHSLER 3D, supra note 9, at
370.
196. This argument has never been made in a clear or forceful form. Frank Thompson,
Jr. and Daniel H. Pollitt make a factually incorrect argument that, were it correct, might be
seen as depriving Lauf s statements of holding status regarding the power to exclude con-
stitutional claims. Thompson & Pollitt, supra note 15, at 838 & n.161. The authors assert
that the plaintiff in Lauf"did not argue that he [sic] had a constitutional right to a federal
court injunction against labor union picketing." Id. Although the lower court opinions
are less than clear on this point, the respondent-plaintiff did make such an argument
before the Supreme Court. Brief of the Respondent at 19-20, Lauf v. E.G. Shinner & Co.,
303 U.S. 323 (1938) (No. 293). The plaintiff argued a second sort of unconstitutionality as
well: that Congress's powers under Article III to control jurisdiction did not permit exclu-
sion of his case. Id. at 20-22. The Supreme Court never rejected these arguments as im-
properly preserved below. See Lauf 303 U.S. at 325-31. Instead, it avoided resolving the
substantive due process claim to an injunction by remanding with instructions to the fed-
eral trial court to determine whether the Norris-LaGuardia Act's anti-injunction provision
required dismissal. Id. at 330-31. It is this disposition that some have read as indicating
that Congress's jurisdictional powers override substantive rights. In the discussion below, I
explain why this may be wrong, but Thompson and Pollitt's work offers me no support.
Three sets of commentators do make arguments somewhat resembling mine. See Ei-
senberg, supra note 15; Sager, supra note 3; and Tushnet & Jaff, supra note 17. See infra
notes 221-222 for discussion of these arguments.
197. See infra note 222 and accompanying text.
198. Respondent's Brief at 19-20, Lauf (No. 293).
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Norris-LaGuardia anti-injunction provisions applied. 199 On the sur-
face, it would seem safe to say the Supreme Court held that Congress's
jurisdictional powers trumped the constitutional rights which were as-
serted. In other words, the Court apparently upheld court stripping.
The significant issue in Lauf for purposes of this Article, was
whether the Norris-LaGuardia Act prohibited the federal courts from
granting the relief requested.2 0 0 The applicable provisions of that law
prohibited federal courts from issuing injunctions in "labor disputes"
unless stringent criteria were met.20 ' Lauf was a suit to restrain a
union from what was alleged to be abusive picketing. 20 2 According to
findings by the federal district court, the plaintiffs employees had de-
clined to join the defendant union and the union picketed the em-
ployer in order to persuade it to require its employees to join.20 1
Plaintiffs suit, grounded on diversity of citizenship jurisdiction, al-
leged that the picketing violated its rights under state law.204 The
lower federal courts determined that the Act did not apply because
the case involved no labor dispute. 2 5  The Supreme Court dis-
agreed 20 6 and remanded for a determination as to whether an injunc-
tion was warranted under the statute's very narrow exceptions. ° 7
Before reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court said of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act's withdrawal of jurisdiction to grant injunctions
in many labor disputes: "There can be no question of the power of
Congress thus to define and limit the jurisdiction of the inferior
courts of the United States." 208 It is this statement, in the context of
Lauf s facts and an important earlier precedent, Truax v. Corrigan,2 °9
which Hart seems to read as holding that Congress's jurisdictional
powers permit it to exclude many, if not all, constitutionally based
causes of action from the trial jurisdiction of the federal courts.2 1 0
199. Lauf 303 U.S. at 329-31.
200. Id. See Act of March 23, 1932, ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115
(1988)).
201. 29 U.S.C. § 113(c) (defining "labor dispute"); 29 U.S.C. § 107 (listing prerequisites
to issuing an injunction).
202. Lauf 303 U.S. at 325-26.
203. Id. at 325-26.
204. Id. at 327, 330-31.
205. Id. at 326-27.
206. Id. at 327-28.
207. Id. at 330-31. See 29 U.S.C. § 107. Excerpts of the Act's exceptions appear, infra, in
text accompanying note 220.
208. Id. at 330 (footnote omitted).
209. 257 U.S. 312 (1921).
210. See supra notes 53-60 and accompanying text.
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There is, however, another possible reading of Lauf which
emerges from a careful re-examination of the language and structure
of the opinion. The opinion can be read as skirting the issue ofjuris-
dictional powers versus constitutional rights.
The anti-injunction provision of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, up-
held in Lauf contained an exception which permitted injunctions in
certain labor disputes when such injunctions were the only reasonable
way of protecting against irreparable harm to business interests.2 11
Language in Truax v. Corrigan strongly suggested that it would be a
violation of due process for a state not to provide a property holder
with an injunctive remedy for harms inflicted by other private individ-
uals if the state provided no other effective protection.212 In this light, Lauf
takes on a different cast. Arguably, the Norris-LaGuardia Act's provi-
sion permitting injunctions in labor disputes in exceptional circum-
stances saved it from frustrating due process protected rights.
2 13
Narrow though it was, it is possible that the Supreme Court saw this
exception as sufficiently broad to allow the federal trial courts jurisdic-
tion to grant any injunction which was required by due process.
One can read the language and structure of the Court's opinion
to suggest that, before it upheld the anti-injunction provisions of Nor-
ris-LaGuardia, the Court had first determined the provisions would
not operate to exclude from the federal courts any injunctive actions
to which plaintiff possessed a right under the Due Process Clause.21 4
If this is true, Lauf contains no holding permitting jurisdictional pow-
ers to trump constitutional claims:. The Court first determined that
the Norris-LaGuardia Act drew exactly the right constitutional lines,
excluding no injunction to which plaintiff had a substantive constitu-
tional right.215
211. 29 U.S.C. § 107 (1988). See supra notes 200-207 and infra notes 218-221 and accom-
panying text.
212. Truax, 257 U.S. at 330. See also infta note 228 for discussion of the business interests
in Truax and constitutional rights.
213. See infra notes 221-222 and accompanying text.
214. See infra notes 221-223 and accompanying text.
215. At the time Lauf was decided, it is unclear whether commentators saw Laufs state-
ments of plenary congressional control as clearly correct or simply as dictum with respect
to constitutional claims. The commentators simply did not address the issue of the validity
of Congress's exclusion of constitutional claims from the lower federal courts. The follow-
ing exhaustive list of contemporary scholarly materials discussing Lauf bears that out. All
are student notes or comments. None discusses the validity of court stripping. James D.
Carr, Note, Anti-Injunction Statute-Definition of a Labor Dispute, 16 N.C. L. REv. 411 (1938);
Erwin B. Ellmann, Comment, When a "Labor Dispute" Exists Within the Meaning of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, 36 MICH. L. REv. 1146 (1938); Edward Scheunemann, 'LaborDisputes" Under
the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 10 RocKY MTN. L. REv. 193 (1938); Recent Case Note, Norris-La-
Guardia Anti-Injunction Act-Existence of a Labor Dispute, 13 IND. L.J. 516 (1938); Recent
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A look to the merits of a constitutional claim to determine the
constitutional validity of a jurisdictional limit is not unprecedented.
As we have seen, the Battaglia court first determined that no constitu-
tional claims would be blocked before it affirmed the validity ofjuris-
dictional restrictions presented to it.2" 6 Indeed, the Battaglia court
concluded that the jurisdictional limit was valid only because it did
not block adjudication of valid constitutional claims.2 17
How might it be inferred that the Lauf Court upheld the anti-
injunction provision only after determining that the provision would
block no due process rights? The Lauf majority affirmed Congress's
jurisdictional powers immediately after quoting the safeguard exception
to the Norris-LaGuardia anti-injunction provision invoked in Lauf 2 18
Recall that the Court ends a paragraph saying: "There can be no
question of the power of Congress thus to define and limit the jurisdic-
tion of the inferior Courts of the United States." 2 19 The full passage
in which the court upholds Congress's powers is easily compatible
with a view of those powers as not permitting exclusion of constitu-
tional claims:
Section 7 [of the Norris-LaGuardia Act] declares that
"no court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue
Cases, 23 MINN. L. REv. 521, 549-50 (1938); Recent Cases, 86 U. PA. L. REv. 780, 784-85
(1938); Recent Decisions, 24 VA. L. REv. 677, 684-85 (1938).
216. Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254, 257 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S.
887 (1948). See supra notes 81-86 and accompanying text.
217. Id.
218. The provision of the Norris-LaGuardia Act under consideration and quoted by the
Court in Lauf was section 7, which allowed certain labor injunctions, when required by
compelling circumstances. See infra note 220 and accompanying text. Not at issue in Lauf
was section 4, 29 U.S.C. §§ 104 (1988), which flatly forbade certain other labor injunctions,
including those sought to stop employees and their union from taking specified actions
against their employer. Particularly, section 4 prohibited injunctive enforcement of yellow
dog contracts-contracts whereby employers successfully bargained with employees that
they will not engage in union activities. See S. REP. No. 163, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 14-18
(1932). The activities at issue in Lauf did not fall under section 4 because the employer's
injunction sought relief against the alleged disruptive activities of a union that the employ-
ees had refused to join. See supra note 203 and accompanying text. Consequently the
Court in Lauf did not confront the constitutionality of a provision that forbade, without
exceptions for compelling circumstances, injunctions against union activities.
However, even as to the flat prohibition in section 4, not at issue in Lauf, the legislative
history carries some indication that Congress believed that the Court was likely to conclude
that Section 4 blocked no constitutional rights. See H.R. RP. No. 669, 72d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1932). The Congress appeared to find some solace in the Courts recent pronouncements
on the right of employees to organize, id. at 7, and indicating that it believed that the
Court had given Congress no reason to believe that outlawing injunctions would be uncon-
stitutional, id. at 16. These statements arguably offer support for the proposition that Con-
gress had no intention to block the assertion of Constitutional fights.
219. Lauf 303 U.S. at 330 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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a temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving
or growing out of a labor dispute; ... "except after findings
of fact by the court, to the effect (a) that unlawful acts have
been threatened and will be committed unless restrained"
.... By subsections (b) to (e) it is provided that relief shall
not be granted unless the court finds that substantial and irrepa-
rable injury to complainants' property will follow; that.. . greater
injury will be inflicted upon the complainant by denying the relief
than will be inflicted upon defendants by granting it; that complain-
ant has no adequate remedy at law; and that the public officers
charged with the duty to protect complainants'property are unable or
unwilling to provide adequate protection. There can be no question
of the power of Congress thus to define and limit the jurisdiction of
the inferior courts of the United States.220
The italicized language suggests that the unavailability of state po-
lice protection for business interests in a labor dispute and the inade-
quacy of a damage action combine to permit a federal injunction, if
the usual irreparable harm and balance of the equities tests are also
met.22 1 Coming near the end of a paragraph which the majority may
have intended to indicate the compatibility of the Act with substantive
due process, the word "thus" could be read as meaning "under cir-
cumstances where injunctions are available if constitutionally neces-
sary." If this is what the Court in Lauf intended, then it left for
another day's determination the constitutionality of congressional
limits on jurisdiction that close out constitutional rights. 2 22
220. Id. at 329-30 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
221. The statute certainly does not say that remedies in the state courts are per se ade-
quate. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1988). Indeed, if one does not interpret "public officers
charged with the duty to protect complainants' property" as including state judges, 29
U.S.C. § 107(e), the statute does not seem to imply that the availability of adequate injunc-
tive relief in the state courts ousts the federal courts of power to grant an injunction. Cf
Tushnet &Jaff, supra note 17, at 1322 n.52 (viewing the availability of an injunctive remedy
in state courts as saving the Norris-LaGuardia Act's exclusion of federal jurisdiction from
unconstitutionality).
222. Eisenberg offers similar analysis leading to the conclusion that the Norris-LaGuar-
dia Act is constitutional "today," but clearly he does not suggest, as I do, that Lauf itself may
have used the interpretation he offers of the Norris-LaGuardia Act to avoid deciding the
constitutionality of the jurisdictional exclusion as applied in Lauf Eisenberg, supra note
15, at 528-29. Instead, he appears to assume that the Court in Lauf upheld the Act's juris-
dictional exclusion of plaintiffs attack on the anti-injunction provision without a real reso-
lution of the merits: "[T] he Lauf Court did not have to reach the substantive issue of the
validity of the district court injunction because it upheld the withdrawal of jurisdiction
.... Id. at 529. Apparently Eisenberg finds this somewhat troublesome because he reads
an earlier case, Truax v. Corrrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921), to recognize a constitutional right
to an injunction that would have been extinguished by the anti-injunction provisions of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act. After discussing Truax, Eisenberg sets out to narrow what he be-
lieves otherwise would have been Lauf s broad holding in favor of court stripping. He does
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While this is a plausible alternative reading of Lauf, it is not with-
out difficulties. The possible inferences just discussed are weakened
by other features of the opinion. First, the Court never says expressly
that the Norris-LaGuardia Act is compatible with any substantive due
process right to relief which might have remained in 1938. Second,
this by concluding that the substantive due process approach taken in Truax had fallen
from favor in the Supreme Court. Though he describes Truax itself as "in peril" and "dis-
credited," he never describes it as overruled. Eisenberg, supra note 15, at 529.
The meaning of this analysis is not clear. On the one hand, if Eisenberg had read the
Norris-LaGuardia Act to permit any injunction substantively required by due process, he
would have had no need to discredit Truax in order to limit Lauf. On this assumption,
Lauf would contain no holding that Congress can exclude constitutional rights, because
the Act would have been read not to exclude them.
On the other hand, if the Court had overruled Truax sub silentio in order to validate
the Act's jurisdictional exclusion, then the Lauf Court found court stripping unconstitu-
tional. However, nowhere is there any hint of this in the Lauf Court's opinion. Addition-
ally, Eisenberg does not seem to view Lauf as holding that a jurisdictional restriction is
invalid if it excludes enforcement of a real constitutional right: He says that the Court
avoided the substantive merits of the constitutional claim of a right to an injunction. Id.
Eisenberg's analysis leaves us with the difficult notion that a federal court that upholds
the exclusion of an alleged constitutional right from its jurisdiction without first passing on
the merits of the claim can somehow manage to avoid holding that the jurisdictional exclu-
sion is valid irrespective of the validity of the constitutional claim. But how else could one
characterize such a decision other than as a holding that jurisdictional provisions trump
substantive constitutional rights?
My plausible reading of Lauf avoids these difficulties by showing how one could read
Lauf as interpreting the Norris-LaGuardia Act to permit any injunction required by due
process, including Truax style due process if it still held sway. I do not suggest that the
Supreme Court expected the district court to overrule Truax on remand. Carefully ex-
amined, Truaxwas an equal protection case and Laufa due process case of first impression.
See infra notes 252-256 and accompanying text. It would make sense to allow a federal
district court familiar with all of the facts to determine whether the specific injunction
sought in Lauf met the Norris-LaGuardia Act's exceptional circumstances test: a test that
may have permitted injunctions where required by due process and possibly in other
circumstances.
Larry Sager's argument may be similar to mine. See Sager, supra note 3. Sager first
emphasizes the quite different argument that the substantive due process right asserted in
Laufwas probably no longer plausible when Laufwas decided. See id. at 19 n.6. This alone
does not, however, destroy Laufs status as holding, because the Court used the jurisdic-
tional provision to avoid resolving the merits. See supra notes 202-207 and accompanying
text. Sager then alludes in the same footnote to the fact that the Norris-LaGuardia Act
.permits labor injunctions in certain circumstances." Sager, supra note 3, at 19 & n.6.
Sager never explains how this is connected to the proposition asserted in the accompany-
ing text that the "judiciary has never had the occasion to rule decisively on [the constitu-
tionality of court stripping]." Id at 19. It is possible that, by these fragmentary statements,
Sager intends to assert a version of the argument that I have just concluded in the text
above. See supra notes 211-221 and accompanying text.
Certainly that portion of the Norris-LaGuardia Act at issue in Lauf, section 7, and its
legislative history are compatible with the interpretation that I offer above. See supra note
218. Even those harsher provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act which flatiy preclude some
injunctions, are not clear as to their intent to exclude injunctions if required by due pro-
cess or equal protection. Id.
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the Act's exceptions permitting injunctions may have been too mini-
ma 223 to preserve due process from the perspective of the Lochner v.
New York22 4 ethos, if the latter still prevailed as late as the Lauf
decision.225
A third objection to this revisionist reading stems from a citation
appearing in Lauf At the end of the crucial passage approving Con-
gress's powers "thus" to regulate jurisdiction, the Court cites to Kline
v. Burkhardt Construction.226 The passages cited in Kline state strongly
and clearly that there are no limits on Congress's power to limit the
jurisdiction of the lower federal courts.227
The Lauf Court's citation to Kline weakens a revisionist reading,
but not decisively. Like similar statements in Sheldon and Lockerty,
Kline's statements are dicta as to constitutional claims.228 Moreover, it
223. The requirement that state officers be found unable or unwilling to protect the
rights of businesses, 29 U.S.C. § 7, may have been so stringent as to make injunctions un-
available in some cases where they were required by the Constitution.
224. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
225. Substantive due process doctrine developed in the nineteenth century as natural
rights and natural law philosophy was read into the Due Process Clause to invalidate state
and federal legislation. The height of Supreme Court acceptance and application of this
doctrine occurred during the period from the turn of the century to approximately 1936.
Lochner v. NewYork, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), exemplifies this period. In Lochner, and in many
other cases of the period, the Court invalidated economic and social legislation which it
viewed as interfering with the liberty to contract. SeeJOHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. Ro-
TUNDA, CONSTrrUTIONAL LAw § 11.3 (4th ed. 1991); GERALD GUNTHER, INDMDUAL RIGHTS
IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 104-62 (12th. ed. 1991).
During this period, many states and the federal government began to experiment with
economic and social legislation, ranging from the regulation of work hours to health con-
ditions in the workplace. However, the Court struck down these reforms as contrary to the
substance of the Due Process Clause, except when the state could strongly justify the legis-
lation as appropriate exercise of the police power. See, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412
(1908). This judicial interventionism began to ebb by the time of the New Deal and the
Court's 1938 Lauf decision. See NOwAK & ROTUNDA, supra; GUNTHER, supra. See also infra
notes 245, 247.
226. Lauf 303 U.S. at 330 n.ll.
227. Kline v. Burkhardt Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 233-34 (1922).
228. Kline was a breach of contract action, id. at 227, that did not involve a restriction on
the lower federal courts' jurisdiction in any ordinary sense. In Kline, the Court considered
arguments concerning the power of federal courts to enjoin duplicative proceedings pend-
ing in state court. Id. at 233-34. The party supporting the injunction argued that, if a
federal court failed to enjoin then pending state court proceedings that duplicated those
pending before the federal court, the state court might reach judgment first. This would
in turn require dismissal of the federal proceedings on res judicata grounds, ultimately
depriving the plaintiffs of a federal judgment. Id. at 229, 233. This argument raised no
constitutional issues other than the res judicata/jurisdictional issue. In rejecting it, the
Court stated that the availability of a federal forum in the first place was entirely a matter of
legislative grace. Id. at 233. This proposition seems adequate to reject plaintiffs' argument
that the state court proceedings should be stayed, but it is much broader than was neces-
sary to do so. There is nothing obviously constitutionally problematic about a regime in
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is possible that they are not even dicta. Perhaps Kline and cases con-
taining similar language, such as Sheldon v. Sill,229 did not intend their
statements to cover exclusions aimed at constitutional rights. If so,
the view of the Court in these cases parallels the reading of Witkowski
v. United States.. ° and Armstrong v. United States"' which I offer
above. 2 ' One might view the citation of Kline in Lauf as saying: "We
have made some very broad statements of Congress' power in cases
such as Kline, but certainly here, where the courts have jurisdiction
when necessary to provide what due process requires, there can be no
question of Congress' power."
In my view, the plausible, but less than certain alternative reading
of Lauf that I offer above, leaves Congress's powers over the lower
federal courts as unsettled after Lauf as its powers over the Supreme
Court's appellate jurisdiction are left after Ex Parte McCardle.2 33 Like
Lauf, McCardle contains much language suggesting that it upheld con-
gressional power to exclude constitutional claims,2 32 but McCardle's
circumstances and some of its language ultimately call into question
its value as a clear holding favoring absolute control. 35 Commenta-
tors generally have treated McCardle as less than a clear holding that
Congress has plenary power to exclude constitutional issues from the
Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. 236 Laufdeserves the same sta-
which federal courts must be open to hear constitutional claims, but in which earlier state
court judgments as to those claims are accorded preclusive effect by the lower federal
courts. Of course, the Supreme Court remains open to review the merits of state court
judgements that preclude the maintenance or continuance of specific federal actions.
229. 49 U.S. 453, 8 How. 441 (1850). See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
230. 7 Ct. Cl. 501 (1872).
231. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 154 (1872).
232. See supra notes 154-168 and accompanying text.
233. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868).
234. Id at 512-15; William Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Ex Parte McCardle, 15 Ajuz. L.
REv. 229, 248-52, 254-60 (1973).
235. See McCardle, 74 U.S. at 515 (dismissing an appeal but suggesting, in the opinion's
last paragraph, that there may have been a route by which McCardle could have raised his
constitutional issues before the Supreme Court other than by means of the route that
Congress chose to close off); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, CONSTrrIONAL LAW 15-20 (1972); Mor-
ris D. Forkosch, The Exceptions and Regulations Clause of Article III and a Person's Constitutional
Rights: Can the Latter be Limited by Congressional Power Under the Former?, 72 W. VA. L. REv.
238, 246-51 (1970); Hart, supra note 2, at 1364; Leonard G. Ratner, Congressional Power Over
the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 157, 178-80 (1960); see also
Van Alstyne, supra note 234, at 247-50. Van Alstyne accepts the characterization of McCar-
dle's statements as to the exclusion of Constitutional claims as dicta, but sees this as "techni-
cal revisionism." Id. at 249-50. He takes McCardle's dicta seriously in finding no internal
limits to Congress's exceptions power, but does find limits in other provisions of the Con-
stitution such as the Bill of Rights. Id. at 259-60.
236. Ratner, supra note 235, at 178-80 (concluding that McCardle did not hold that Con-
gress can withhold any constitutional claims from the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdic-
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tus in its realm, dealing with congressional powers over the lower fed-
eral courts.
2. The Strength of Any Holding in Lauf.-In the preceding sec-
tion, I argued that Laufs statements affirming Congress's court-strip-
ping powers are plausibly no more than dicta. More precisely, the
Supreme Court may have resolved Lauf on statutory interpretation
grounds, thereby avoiding a decision as to the constitutionality of
court stripping. But even if I am wrong and Lauf does contain a hold-
ing validating court stripping, that holding is a comparatively weak
one. It is weak because of the probable invalidity of the substantive
constitutional claims 23 7 which the Court may have allowed Congress
to exclude from consideration by the federal courts. This argument
has been suggested by several commentators but never fully spelled
out.
2 3 8
The first premise of these arguments is that, by early 1938 when
Lauf was decided, the substantive due process rights asserted in Lauf
and blocked by the Norris-LaGuardia Act were no longer plausible.
These alleged rights were those of a business (1) to be free from cer-
tain sorts of regulatory interference and (2) to an injunction to effec-
tuate the rights referred to in (1)..239 The argument is that these were
the alleged rights asserted in Lauf and that they belonged to the sub-
stantive due process regime of Lochner, a regime which had been repu-
diated by the time of Lauf 4°
The unstated but obviously implicit second premise must be that
the weakness of the substantive rights asserted would weaken Lauf s
tion); Hart, supra note 2, at 1364 (rejecting McCardle as a precedent clearly supporting
broad Congressional powers, Hart wrote: "You read the McCardle case for all it might be
worth rather than the least it has to be worth, don't you?").
237. See supra note 225 for an explanation of the decline of substantive process.
238. Rotunda implicitly endorses this argument by applying post-Carolene Products ra-
tional basis equal protection analysis, see Carolene Prods. Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 18
(1944), to the Norris-LaGuardia Act and concluding that the Act violated no substantive
right because the classification made in Lauf involved no suspect class. Rotunda, supra
note 15, at 851-52. From this, he concludes that the Supreme Court "implicitly acknowl-
edged" the demise of the earlier declared constitutional rights whose assertion may have
been blocked in Lauf Id at 852. In the context of his argument that substantive constitu-
tional rights limit Congress's court-stripping powers, his point seems to be that Lauf is
consistent with the proposition that constitutional rights cannot be trumped by Congress's
Article III powers. Id. at 851-52. See also Eisenberg, supra note 15, at 529-30 (apparently
taking some solace from the fact that by the time Lauf was decided the substantive rights
urged by the plaintiff were "already in peril"); Tushnet &Jaff, supra note 17, at 1322 n.52
(recognizing briefly the argument discussed in this section of my Article, although not
endorsing it).
239. See supra notes 193-194 and accompanying text; Lauf 303 U.S. at 325.
240. See supra note 225 and infra note 245.
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jurisdictional holding. On the surface this seems very strange. In
Lauf the respondent raised both a claim of substantive constitutional
entitlement to an injunction and a claim that Congress's exclusion of
such claims from the federal courts was unconstitutional.24' Recall
that, for the purposes of this section, we are assuming that the Lauf Court
disposed of the case by giving effect to the Norris-LaGuardia Act as a
court-stripping provision. Assuming this, it follows that the Court
thought that the merits of the constitutional claims asserted were irrel-
evant. To put it another way, by deciding the jurisdictional issue with-
out resolving the merits, the Court recognized the possible validity of
the substantive constitutional claims, but nevertheless allowed their
exclusion.
How can an assessment that the claims were substantively weak
detract from the strength of the Court's very different conclusion that
their weakness, strength or even clear validity was irrelevant because
of Congress's power to trump enforcement of constitutional rights
through its power over jurisdiction? To the extent that the argument
for weak precedential weight has any validity, its point must be psycho-
logical: A court may be less careful about affirming Congress's court-
stripping powers when the stakes are lower, that is, when in fact no
constitutional rights are likely to be frustrated. This seems the most
likely unstated premise underlying the commentary which advances
the "Lochner was dead" argument for weakening any holding in
Lauf242 It is common sense that, as the amount at stake increases, the
more carefully a decision-maker tends to think. There is some sup-
port in Supreme Court cases for the proposition that a less carefully
considered holding merits less precedential weight. For example, the
Supreme Court's practice of treating a holding in summary affir-
mances as entitled to less weight than that in fully considered opin-
ions also supports this proposition.243
If we accept the premises that substantive weakness leads to de-
creased consideration and that decreased consideration leads to de-
creased precedential weight, we must nevertheless examine the
factual basis of the very first premise: that the Justices knew Lochner's
substantive due process scheme was dead. Here analysis seems to re-
quire more than the received hindsight.
241. Respondent's Brief at 19-20, Laufv. E.G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323 (1938) (No.
293). See supra notes 185-198 and accompanying text.
242. For this commentary see supra note 238.
243. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 670-71 (1974) ("They are not of the same prece-
dential value as would be an opinion.., on the merits." (footnote omitted)).
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Admittedly there is great force to the notion that the regime of
Lochner was ending as Lauf was decided. Lauf was decided after West
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish244 when the Justices opposing the regime of
Lochner seemed to turn the tide of war,245 but about two months
before the Court's decision in Carolene Products,246 the Appomattox of
the Lochner regime. 47
While it is fair to guess that at the time of Lauf it was implausible
that Lochner-style rights would be extended, this is not sufficient to
support Lauf as a substantively easy case. Hart's account of Laufsug-
gests that the appellant sought, not a mere extension of Lochner, but
rather, the overruling of clear substantive due process precedents,
such as Truax v. Corrigan.248 Using a jurisdictional provision to ex-
clude a highly specific right, clearly established under the Lochner re-
gime, might well be troubling to the Court. One might expect that
these circumstances would increase the care with which the Court con-
sidered the jurisdictional exclusion, casting doubt on the argument I
present here to discount Lauf s upholding of court
stripping. Yet, this reasoning assumes Lauf was asserting an estab-
lished right, rather than presenting a case of first impression. My ar-
gument in this section is that Lauf was a case of first impression in a
climate hostile to the rights asserted. Therefore, it is possible that its
jurisdictional holding was less carefully considered due to the improb-
ability that constitutional rights in fact would be denied enforcement.
As I read them, Henry Hart's article and casebook suggest that
Lauf blocked clearly established rights. Running the usual risks of
lengthy quotation, here are the key casebook passages:
The Norris-LaGuardia Act ... narrowly restricted the au-
thority of courts of the United States to issue a restraining
order or a temporary or permanent injunction in "a case in-
volving or growing out of a labor dispute," and provided that
244. 300 U.S. 379 (1936).
245. The Court signaled in West Coast Hotel and Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502
(1934), that it was beginning to curtail its strict review of ordinary social and economic
legislation. See NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 225; GUNTHER, supra note 225. For a fuller
discussion of the Lochner regime, see supra note 225.
246. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
247. By 1938, perhaps in response both to growing criticism that it had abandoned its
traditional restrained role and to political pressure from the Roosevelt White House, the
Court made a definite step away from the interventionism of the substantive due process
analyses of its early twentieth century case law. In Carolene Products, the Court announced
its intention to uphold legislation if it was reasonably supported by any "facts either known
or which could reasonably be assumed." Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 154 (emphasis added). See
NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 225.
248. 257 U.S. 312 (1921); see HART & WECHSLER lsT, supra note 9, at 295.
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"yellow-dog" contracts [employee agreements to forswear
union activities] "shall not be enforceable in any court of the
United States and shall not afford any basis for the granting
of legal or equitable relief by any such court." The term
"court of the United States" was defined to mean "any court
of the United States whose jurisdiction has been or may be
conferred or defined or limited by Act of Congress." The
Act throughout was drawn as a limitation of the 'jurisdic-
tion" of the courts.
At the time of the enactment, Truax v. Corrigan... had
found state legislation similarly limiting employers' remedies
to be a denial of due process; and [the earlier cases] Coppage
v. Kansas, ... and Adair v. United States,... had held that the
right to condition employment on an undertaking not to
join a labor union or on non-membership also was protected
by the due process clauses of the Constitution.
Did the fact that the Norris-LaGuardia Act, as inter-
preted, merely limited federal jurisdiction render these [fed-
eral] due process arguments (whatever their validity)
irrelevant? This was the view of the reports of the Judiciary
Committees .... The position was apparently sustained by the
Supreme Court in Lauf v. Shinner. . . Justice Roberts saying:
"There can be no question of the power of Congress thus to
define and limit the jurisdiction of the inferior courts of the
United States." 249
I believe these passages, although not clear on the point, uninten-
tionally give a misimpression that the constitutional right to an injunc-
tion asserted in Lauf was the same as that asserted in Truax,
specifically a right to an injunction to enforce a yellow-dog
contract.
250
Such an understanding of Lauf is doubly wrong. First, neither
Truax itself nor Lauf involved a yellow-dog contract. Second, the con-
stitutional right to an injunction that Truax did establish was most
clearly grounded on the Equal Protection Clause not on the Due Pro-
249. HART & WECHSLER Isr, supra note 9, at 295 (emphasis added) (citations and foot-
note omitted) (quoting Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101, 103, 113(d) (1988)).
250. The third and current edition of Hart & Wechsler contains the following footnote
appended to the just quoted passage: "Lauf was an action by an employer to enjoin a
union and one of its officials from engaging in picketing and related activities," HART &
WECHSLER 3D, supra note 9, at 370 n.6. Although I am not sure, I believe this note is
designed to dispell the possible inferences from the passages above that Lauf involved a
.yellow-dog contract," as considered in Coppage, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) and Adair, 208 U.S. 161
(1908) or the specific right to an injunction declared in Truax.
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cess Clause.2 5 ' In Truax, the Court found it an equal protection viola-
tion for a state to grant businesses injunctions to protect their
interests from a variety of injurious behavior, but to deny injunctions
to protect against injury stemming from labor disputes.2 5 2
The Equal Protection Clause contains prohibitions running
against state governments, but not the federal government.253 Conse-
quently Truax's precise equal protection holding, directed at state leg-
islation, was unavailable for use against the Act of Congress attacked
in Lauf2 5 4 It is true that in dicta Truax did suggest that an inequality
might be so grotesque as to violate due process as well as equal protec-
255tion. However, cases decided both just before and just after Lauf
made clear that the standards were different so that federally created
251. Truax, 257 U.S. at 331-39. The Court suggested the possibility of a due process
violation as well, but seemed to avoid definitive resolution of that issue. Id. at 330-39; see
also infra note 254.
252. Id. The Truax Court reviewed an Arizona statute that prohibited state courts from
issuing injunctions in certain labor disputes. The suit was brought in an Arizona court by
an employer who sought an injunction to stop former employees and their union from
"destroying" plaintiff's business by allegedly abusive and threatening behavior. Id. at 321-
22. Based on the statute, the state courts refused the injunction. Id. at 323-24. The
Supreme Court reversed on grounds that the anti-injunction statute was a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, id. at 331, and possibly of its Due Pro-
cess Clause as well. Id. at 330; see also supra note 254.
The clear holding in Truax was that the state statute violated Fourteenth Amendment
Equal Protection by providing an injunctive remedy for businesses injured generally but
not for that subset injured in specified labor disputes. Id. at 331-39. The Supreme Court
concluded that the distinction between businesses generally injured by wrongful conduct
and the subset of those injured in the context of labor disputes was not a difference "which
bears a reasonable and just relation to the act in respect to which the classification is pro-
posed." Id. at 337. Today such a distinction almost certainly would not violate equal pro-
tection because the Court nearly conclusively presumes the reasonableness of any
legislative classification which involves neither suspect classifications nor fundamental
rights. See, e.g., Federal Communications Comm'n v. Beach Communications, Inc. 113 S.
Ct. 2096, 2101 (1993) ("In areas of social and economic policy, a statutory classification
that neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights
must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable
state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.") (citations omitted).
Truax demonstrates that, in 1921, equal protection analysis paralleled the strict scrutiny
then current under Lochner for substantive due process claims.
253. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
254. See Truax, 257 U.S. at 331-32. Contrary to familiar current due process principles,
the Supreme Court suggested that a state's failure to grant any judicial remedy for one
private party's destruction of another's property, might deprive the latter of due process of
law. Id. at 329-30. Arguably, however, this was dictum because the Court skeptically recog-
nized at least a possibility that some sufficient non-injunctive remedy remained available to
the plaintiffs. Id. at 330.
255. Id.
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inequalities often would not violate due process even if they would
violate equal protection.256
As a result of all this, the substantive constitutional merits of Lauf
did not follow easily from those of Truax. The Court could not have
simply struck down the federal statute on grounds that identical (or
even similar) state laws had been held to violate equal protection in
Truax. Issues of first impression under the Due Process Clause would
have been presented. I agree with the implicit view of several com-
mentators that after West Coast Hotel and weeks before Carolene Prod-
ucts, it is likely that a majority of Justices knew that the Court would
resolve such an issue in favor of the constitutionality of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act.
For purposes of argument, then, let us assume that which I dis-
puted in section B.1 above. Let us assume that the due process right
asserted in Lauf was excluded on purely jurisdictional grounds. Even
on ihis assumption, the analysis presented in this section shows that
the existence of the right which the plaintiff claimed in Lauf was an
issue of first impression appearing in an inhospitable climate. Hence
I find at least plausible the implicit arguments of some commentators.
Their view seems to be that the Lauf Court may have been less careful
in its opinion excluding that right from the federal courts and that
256. Two cases, roughly contemporaneous with Lauf provide indications of the proposi-
tions (1) that some inequalities might be so sufficiently gross to violate both due process
and equal protection but that (2) equal protection was the more confining standard. In a
pre-Laufcase, Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937), the Court wrote:
The Fifth Amendment unlike the Fourteenth has no equal protection clause....
If this latitude ofjudgment is lawful for the states, it is lawful, a fortiori, in legisla-
tion by the Congress, which is subject to restraints less narrow and confining....
The classifications and exemptions [in question here would] be upheld if they
had been adopted by a state and the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment
were invoked to annul them .... [Therefore the] act of Congress is ... valid, so
far at least as its system of exemptions is concerned, and this though we assume that
discrimination, if gross enough, is equivalent to confiscation and subject under the Fifth
Amendment to challenge and annulment....
Id. at 584-85. In a post-Laufcase, Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, (1939) the Court wrote:
Undoubtedly, the exercise of the commerce power is subject to the Fifth Amend-
ment but that Amendment, unlike the Fourteenth, has no equal protection
clause.... If it be assumed that there might be discrimination of such an injuri-
ous character as to bring into operation the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment, that is a different matter from a contention that mere lack of uni-
formity in the exercise of the commerce power renders the action of Congress
invalid.
Id. at 14.
It was only years later in Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1953)-a companion case to
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1953)-that the Court began reading an equal
protection component into the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause which was substan-
tially identical to the Equal Protection Clause itself.
1995]
MARYLAND LAW REI Ew
therefore any holding supporting court stripping is weakened by the
contemporaneous demise of Lochner.57
CONCLUSION
The case law record contains one absolutely clear Supreme Court
holding as to the validity of court stripping, Armstrong v. United
States.258 That case strikes down a jurisdictional limit that would have
blocked assertion of a constitutional claim in federal trial courts. The
case law contains one opinion, Lauf v. E.G. Shinner & Co.,2 59 which
may or may not be viewed as holding to the contrary. But the dicta in
Sheldon v. Sill,260 Lauf and Lockerty v. Phillips?6 upholding court strip-
ping are extremely strong, and unlike Armstrong, those cases provided
reasons for their conclusions. It is hard to compare the significance
of the Sill-Lauf-Lockerty line of cases with the countervailing force of
Armstrong. On the one hand, the former cases are relatively recent
and contain clear dicta supporting nearly unbridled congressional
power to exclude constitutional claims from enforcement in the lower
federal courts. On the other hand, Armstrong is a much older case, but
there the court actually confronted ajurisdictional exclusion of a con-
stitutional right. It struck down the exclusion and upheld the right. 62
My conclusion from this-that the case law record is much less
clear than previously thought-is a significant one. It proves Justice
Scalia wrong."' From no reasonable perspective do the cases alone
preclude the sort of debate which has been taking place among com-
mentators in recent years and which the Court seemed to legitimate
with Johnson v. Robison.26 4 When the need arises in a case before the
Court, the new scholarship should receive a fair hearing. The Court
should also consider whether court-stripping powers better complete
or whether they undercut the system of checks and balances as they
have evolved from the framers' design. What would be disappointing
would be a statement that the matter is settled followed by a string cite
to Sheldon, Lauf and Hart's fine article.
257. See supra note 238 and accompanying text for a list of articles appearing to this
argument.
258. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 154 (1872).
259. 303 U.S. 323 (1938).
260. 49 U.S. 453, 8 How. 441 (1850).
261. 319 U.S. 182 (1943).
262. Armstrong v. United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 154 (1872).
263. See Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 611-21 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
264. 415 U.S. 361 (1974).
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